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Are Supply Chains Transnational Legal 
Orders? What We Can Learn from the 
Rana Plaza Factory Building Collapse 
Larry Catá Backer* 
Abstract: In 2013, over a thousand workers were killed when the 
Rana Plaza factory building collapsed in Bangladesh, one housing several 
garment factories producing goods for global consumer markets. The collapse, 
and its consequences, exposed both the complex interweaving of national 
law, international standards, and private governance standards that together 
might be understood as a transnational legal order that has some effects on 
business behavior. This essay engages in a close examination of the Rana 
Plaza factory building collapse and its aftermath as the starting point for 
theorizing systemicity in the emerging interlocking systems of national, 
private and international governance orders. At one level, the governance 
architectures around the Rana Plaza building collapse suggests bits and 
pieces of governance and lawmaking that may point to the development of 
distinct governance orders that bump into each other serendipitously. Yet it 
is also possible to theorize systemicity from out of these bits, pieces, and 
bumps that may suggest the nature and forms that are emerging as a distinct 
class of transnational legal order. Starting from the governance response to 
the Rana Plaza building collapse facts, this article examines the way that 
the collective actions of states, international organizations, enterprises, civil 
society, and affected groups evidence a robust transnational legal order. That 
transnational order has a normative structure, operationalizes a legal 
process, and structures a framework within which international 
organizations, and state and non-state private actors strive toward building 
functional coherence within formally polycentric governance orders. 
Alternatively, Rana Plaza might suggest polycentric governance ordering or 
the new face of old hierarchical relations between developed and developing 
states. The essay concludes that the reality of the context in which governance 
arises may continue to defy a single robust theorization. Theories may be 
chasing facts, but the complexity of the legal ordering reflected in the arc of 
*Larry Catá Backer is W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar Professor of Law and
International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. My thanks to my research assistant, Angelo 
Mancini, (Penn. State Law J.D. expected 2018) for his usual excellent work.  
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the story of the Rana Plaza factory building collapse also suggest that facts 
may soon turn on and reshape theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 2015, high level representatives of the governments of the United 
States and the European Union released a statement marking the second anniversary 
of the “tragic collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that claimed 
over 1,100 lives and injured many more . . . mourning those who lost their lives and 
remain mindful of the difficult struggle for those who survived.”1 It was one of 
several statements issued by powerful global actors to mark this event, and the train 
of consequences that followed.2 In stark contrast, the office of the Bangladesh 
1. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Statement on the
Anniversary of Rana Plaza Building Collapse in Bangladesh (Apr. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/april/joint-statement-anniversary-rana. The Joint 
Statement was released in the names of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry; High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini; U.S. Secretary of Labor 
Thomas E. Perez; EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility 
Marianne Thyssen; U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman; EU Commissioner for Trade Cecilia 
Malmström; U.S. Agency for International Development Acting Administrator Alfonso E. Lenhardt; 
and EU Commissioner in charge of International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica. Id.
2.  Among them were those from NGOs, see, e.g., Statement by the Clean Clothes Campaign on 
the second anniversary of the Rana Plaza disaster (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.cleanclothes.org 
/news/2015/04/24/statement-by-the-clean-clothes-campaign-on-the-second-anniversary-of-the-rana 
-plaza-disaster; see also European Parliament resolution of 29 Apr. 2015 on the second anniversary of 
the Rana Plaza building collapse and progress of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact 
(2015/2589(RSP)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-
2015-0175&language=EN&ring=P8-RC-2015-0363.  
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Prime Minister spent the day responding to criticisms of the way in which her 
government had allocated and spent funds earmarked for the victims of that factory 
collapse and their families.3
Yet the U.S.-EU Joint Statement did more than commemorate. Its object was 
not merely to mourn the loss of life in the daily business of global trade along 
complex supply and production chains. Rather, the Joint Statement served as a 
celebration, a commemoration, of the triumph of a new sort of multilateral 
governance architecture, one in which the state, or at least a small state like 
Bangladesh,4 would now share responsibility for governing its own territories with 
others. 
In the aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse, the European Union, the 
United States and the International Labor Organization (ILO) joined with 
Bangladesh (“The Partners”) to undertake a series of significant 
commitments to foster respect for fundamental labor rights and ensure 
worker safety and health in the garment sector. The Partners announced 
the Sustainability Compact for Bangladesh – a statement of principles and 
commitments designed to bring about a lasting transformation in the 
sector.5
That sharing, however, did not merely involve the states that represented the 
largest enterprises which sources garments from much smaller enterprises within 
Bangladesh. It also involved a host of other actors—enterprises, NGOS, labor 
organizations, and international public and private actors, in distinct and complex 
ways.6
The collapse, then, exposed not just the structural weakness of the Rana Plaza 
factory building, but also the structural weaknesses of traditional ways of 
understanding and invoking regulatory authority. But how? The collapse, and its 
consequences, then, might be understood as uncovering the complex interweaving 
of national law, international standards, and private governance standards that 
together might be understood as a transnational legal order that produces effects on 
3.  PMO Trashes TIB Report on Rana Plaza Assistance, THE NEWS TODAY, Apr. 24, 2015, 
http://www.newstoday.com.bd/index.php?option=details&news_id=2409293&date=2015-04-24 
(“Dismissing Transpa-rency International Bangladesh’s (TIB’s) report that claimed Tk 108 crore 
mobilised in the prime minister’s aid fund to distribute among Rana plaza victims remains unused, the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) on Thursday said there is no fund in the name of Rana Plaza, reports 
UNB. “I would like to clearly say there is/was no fund in the name of Rana Plaza in the Prime Minister’s 
Office. There are two funds of the honorable Prime Minister-one is Relief and Welfare Fund and 
another is Discretionary Fund,” said PMO Director General-4 Kabir Bin Anwar. He said this while 
addressing a press conference to clarify TIB’s version on the fund of Rana Plaza victims held at the 
PMO.”). 
4.  The policy and structural issues for law and state systems are considered further in Larry 
Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New 
Global Order, 17(1) BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141-68 (2006). 
5.  Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 1.
6.  The European Parliament Joint Motion provided a clear window on the web of regulatory 
sources and constraints within which Bangladesh now finds itself as actor and object. See European 
Parliament resolution of 29 Apr. 2015, supra note 2.
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business behavior, and on the regulatory activity of states both within and beyond 
its borders.7 Or it might be understood as a reflection of patterns of rough 
consensus around the logic of the societal systems in which even states now 
operate.8 Or it might be understood to serve as a disciplinary and socialization 
technique, a means of managing and gap filling among communities of states.9
This essay uses the circumstances of the Rana Plaza factory building collapse 
and its aftermath as the starting point for an examination of possibilities of 
generalizing theory from circumstances. The connection between theory and fact tends to 
be dynamic at best, and substantially disconnected at worst. It can be distorted as 
much at the micro level from an obsessive examination through the generalized 
implications of data—a cancerous self-referencing empiricism that reduces theory to 
algorithm—as it can be the victim of an inverted cause and effect at the macro level, 
in which theory is used instrumentally to make facts, that is when theory becomes 
politics. Yet in our culture, one marked by elite-driven mass mobilization societies, 
theory can serve both qualitative and quantitative driven instrumentalism by 
offering a coherent structure within which the reality around us can be ordered, 
either around a central concept or insight, or around nothing at all. 
Indeed, the narrative of the Rana Plaza factory building collapse does offer a 
framework for connecting realities on the ground to the construction of theory that 
is around it. Such a theory would have to be dynamic, in the sense that it must 
recognize in the rather complex realities that is the Rana Plaza factory building 
collapse, a temporal sequence of governance arrangements. Alternatively, efforts at 
theorizing the regulatory constructions built on the foundation of the Rana Plaza 
Building collapse might suggest a caution in that theory building and a reminder that 
the relationship between facts and theory might neither be invariably vertically 
arranged or, thus arranged, invariably placing theory above facts on the ground. 
If theorization is possible, might a better theorization of Rana Plaza lie with 
Transnational Legal Order (TLO) theory? It is possible that one might view Rana 
Plaza as evidence of the crystallization of the emergence of a transnational legal 
order governing business behavior. That transnational order has a normative 
structure, operationalizes a legal process, and structures a framework within which 
international organizations, and state and non-state private actors strive toward 
building functional coherence within formally polycentric governance orders. It 
assesses the operation of a normative order that can be viewed in terms of norms 
that affect the understanding of actors of their legal obligations by considering how 
different norm systems—state law, international standards, and private governance 
7.  See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
8.  See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS AND PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING 
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 134-52 (Oxford, 2010). 
9.  See, e.g., Robert Wai, Transnational Public Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46
HARV. INT’L L.J. 471 (2005). 
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standards—intermesh10 in shaping the expectations of businesses and their counsel 
of their legal obligations. And in intermeshing, constitute yet another and potentially 
distinct legal or governance order or orders. That might be done by grounding 
analysis in not only a series of contingent circumstances (transnational business 
activity, activist responses, or different forms of norm building) but also from out 
of precipitating events (such as catastrophes). It is that combination that leads to 
the interaction of these various standards to shape transnational legal norms that 
can be viewed as a form of legal order in a world otherwise lacking centralized legal 
law-making and law-applying institutions as conventionally conceived at the 
national level. Two alternative possibilities are considered as well. First, it may be 
possible to see in Rana Plaza confirmation of the emergence of transnational dis-
order or un-ordering. Alternatively, still, one can see in Rana Plaza a confirmation 
of the workings of the traditional and conventional state-law system and its ability 
to embrace changing circumstances without losing its internal coherence. 
After this introduction, Part II focuses on the events leading up through and 
then past the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building on April 24, 2013. The 
catastrophe is used, in a sense, as a lure to attract the conventional and emerging 
governance actors and then to consider how they behave (in the production of 
governance objects) with the lure and each other. Part III then seeks to extract a 
theory out of the context of the story of the Rana Plaza factory building collapse. 
Does Rana Plaza fit comfortably or uncomfortably into the narrative of TLO, and 
its implications for TLO theory? Does Rana Plaza instead suggest the possibility of 
disordered order, which is of order without a center as an alternative perspective? 
And lastly, does Rana Plaza still fit comfortably into traditional narratives of state-
law system, or point to something considerably more radical? 
II. TRANSNATIONAL OR POLYCENTRIC LEGAL ORDERING IN CONTEXT: THE 
RANA PLAZA FACTORY BUILDING COLLAPSE
While law and governance systems struggle to define themselves, and the 
extent of their authority to order the complexities of the social order, new systems 
of governance emerge in response to events—crystalizing moments—that catalyze 
institutional and mass movements with regulatory or governance effects. One such 
event centered on the operation of a multi-factory building in the suburbs of the 
Bangladeshi capital that collapsed in 2013, killing over a thousand workers. The 
Rana Plaza factory building collapse may nicely illustrate the complex and perhaps 
disordered nature of law and governance making within and beyond any single class 
of individual or institutional actor to manage or order. And, perhaps ironically, it 
may also suggest the ways in which order is arising out of disorder, but an order 
that follows its own logic rather than the authoritative ideologies of state or private 
or popular power arranged neatly within clusters of governance asserting 
10.  See Gunther Teubner, Self Constitutionalizing TNCs?: On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” 
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011). 
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communities. An examination of the Rana Plaza factory building collapse from the 
perspective of its consequences to the established order of law and governance 
within which the building and its factories were operated, might provide a way of 
teasing out some of the characteristics of norm making. The Rana Plaza factory 
building collapse, then, will serve as bait that attracts those norm making and 
enforcing creatures that may be drawn to its scent. Having observed them and their 
characteristics in this section, the possibilities of generalizing observed behaviors 
into theory (which one?) is considered next. 
By the 21st century, garment production, directly and indirectly sourced, 
became a significant element of Bangladesh’s industrial production.11 Much 
economic activity in Bangladesh revolves around maintaining Bangladesh’s 
competitive advantages for sourcing garments within global production chains. By 
April 2013, the town of Savar, in Bangladesh, became an important center for 
garment factory operation.12 Savar had seen a substantial growth in the construction 
of these multi-story and multi-factory buildings since the 1990s.13 “Savar land values 
soared as new factories hurriedly opened to meet the new Western demand.”14
These buildings were partitioned and rented out among a number of businesses that 
operated factories within these factory buildings.15 Most of these factories produced 
clothing, an industry that accounted for much of Bangladesh’s recent growth and 
much of its employment.16 The garments were produced either directly for global 
retailers or were sometimes subcontracted from local manufacturers subcontracting 
work, with or without authorization.17
11.  See Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, BUSINESS AS USUAL IS NOT AND 
OPTION: SUPPLY CHAINS AND SOURCING AFTER RANA PLAZA 12-16 (NYU Stern Center for 
Business and Human Rights) (Apr. 2014), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets 
/documents/con_047408.pdf; cf. 2014), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets 
/documents/con_047408.pdf; Cf. Sarah Labowitz and Dorothée Baumann-Pauly, BEYOND THE TIP
OF THE ICEBERG: BANGLADESH’S FORGOTTEN APPAREL WORKERS (NYU Stern Center for Business 
and Human Rights), (Dec. 2015), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/twadhwa/bangladesh 
/downloads/beyond_the_tip_of_the_iceberg_report.pdf.  
12.  Sabir Mustafa & Shyadul Islam, Profile: Rana Plaza owner Mohammad Sohel Rana, BBC NEWS
ONLINE, May 3, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22366454. (“During the 1990s Savar 
became a sought-after place to locate factories and acquire land for homes, because of its proximity to 
Dhaka. In the rush, illegal land-grabbing became rife.”) 
13.  Id. (“During the 1990s Savar became a sought-after place to locate factories and acquire 
land for homes, because of its proximity to Dhaka.”). 
14.  Jim Yardley, The Most Hated Man in Bangladesh: Toppled from a Shady Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/asia/bangladesh-garment-industry-reliant-
on-flimsy-oversight.html?pagewanted=all. 
15.  CBS/Justine Redman, Inside a Bangladesh Garment Factory, CBS News, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/inside-a-bangladesh-garment-factory/10/. 
16.  Amy Yee, Two years after Bangladesh factory collapse, a struggle to set things right, WASH. POST, Apr. 
23, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/bangladesh-garment-industry-pushes-
to-meet-deadlines-on-safety-standards/2015/04/22/b72ca9f0-e87b-11e4-8581-633c536add4b 
_story.html. (“It accounts for 80 percent of Bangladesh’s exports and has propelled annual economic 
growth of 6 percent in recent years.”). 
17.  Jason Motlagh, A Year After Rana Plaza: What Hasn’t Changed Since The Bangladesh Factory 
Collapse, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-year-after-rana-
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Among the factory building complexes in Savar was an eight-floor garment 
factory building known as the Rana Plaza.18 It had been built during the previous 
decade and housed a number of independent factories under a variety of 
arrangements. The building was said to have been built on swampy ground.19
Government regulation of buildings, structural inspections, and monitoring before 
2013 had been a complicated business with a substantial gap between formal 
regulation and administrative practice and enforcement.20 It was not uncommon for 
building plans filed with the government not to match the building actually built, 
and buildings erected before 2000 might not have architectural drawings at all.21
There were allegations of substantial irregularities in the construction and approval 
of the Rana Plaza factory building itself.22
The owner of the building was Mohammed Sohel Rana, by 2013 in his mid-
30s.23 Mr. Rana had a colorful history, as a student activist, and then an associate of 
powerful politicians and political parties.24 As a consequence, there were rumors 
that suggested that Mr. Rana’s acquisition of the Rana Plaza property might have 
been tinged with illegality25 and that Mr. Rana also participated in some illegal 
plaza-what-hasnt-changed-since-the-bangladesh-factory-collapse/2014/04/18/9a06f266-c1c3-11e3-
b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html. (“A top garment producer admitted to me that unauthorized 
subcontracting remains standard practice across the industry. With so many variables threatening to 
disrupt production — political violence, strikes, electrical breakdowns — he still farms out some work 
to meet deadlines.”).  
18.  Factory Collapse in Bangladesh, Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, Rana 
Plaza: A Look Back and Forward, (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts/rana-
plaza-bangladesh-anniversary-a-look-back-and-forward.  
19.  See Alex Magdaleno, Bangladesh Charges 18 People in Connection With Deadly Factory 
Collapse, MASHABLE, July 16, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/07/16/rana-plaza-charges-
bangladesh/.
20.  See, e.g., Jim Yardley, After Disaster, Bangladesh Lags in Policing Its Maze of Factories, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/world/asia/bangladeshi-inspectors-struggle-to-
avert-a-new-factory-disaster.html. (“Critics often blame this lack of regulation on Dhaka’s development 
authority, known as Rajuk. Last week, the authority’s director told members of Bangladesh’s Parliament 
that roughly 8,000 buildings in Dhaka, the national capital, lacked required approvals or violated 
construction codes. In a later interview, the authority’s chief engineer blamed part of the problem on 
manpower: Rajuk has only 40 inspectors to oversee a million structures in Dhaka.”)  
21.  Id.
22.  Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Luke Harding, Bangladeshi garment factory death toll rises as owner 
arrested on border, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/28 
/bangladesh-garment-factory-collapse-owner-held. (“Rana’s influential political contacts allowed him 
to circumvent the rules and to get rich. He reportedly bought several government-owned properties at 
a discount and in 2010 constructed Rana Plaza on the site of a pond. The building was supposed to be 
five stories high; Rana added an extra three. Two local engineers and the mayor – a political ally – signed 
off on the project.”).  
23.  Mustafa & Islam, supra note 12. 
24.  Id.
25.  Id. (“Rabindranath Sarkar, owner of a building adjacent to Rana Plaza, told the BBC that 
the land had originally been acquired jointly in his name and that of Sohel Rana’s father, Abdul Khalek. 
‘But Sohel Rana and his family grabbed the land forcibly and built the building even though it was 
bought in my name,’ Mr. Sarkar claimed.”). 
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activities.26 “And perhaps no one wielded power more brazenly than Sohel Rana. 
He traveled by motorcycle, as untouchable as a mafia don, trailed by his own biker 
gang.”27 Mr. Rana’s alleged conduct and practices may not have been aberrational.28
Mr. Rana, however, did not own the businesses operating within the Rana 
Plaza building. By April 2013, some 3,639 workers toiled in five factories housed in 
the Rana Plaza building.29 Most of the workers were women working a standard 
shift of between 13 to 14 ½ hours starting usually about 8:00 a.m.30 Many of these 
workers labored on some of the floors of the building that had been added after 
initial construction, which had been added with permission of local officials.31
Officials later suggested that these approvals might have been unauthorized.32 That 
would not have been unusual: it had been reported in the Western press that 
“[b]uilding codes are often unenforced, regulatory oversight is flimsy and the men 
wielding power often travel with armed guards.”33 Others reported 
Rana Plaza had numerous illegal floors built on a hopelessly weak structure. 
Its construction materials were of extremely poor quality, and giant 
vibrating generators had been placed on several floors to keep the power 
on and the sewing machines running during the city’s regular power cuts.34
The factories in the Rana Plaza building did not operate for their own 
account—that is they did not manufacture garments for the retail markets. Most 
produced a variety of garments for about forty global retailers. The apparel 
26.  Id. (“The 35-year-old Mr. Rana has been described in the local media as the archetypal 
Bangladeshi muscleman, known locally as a ‘mastan,’ or neighbourhood heavy. His power, influence 
and money came from providing muscle to local politicians. ‘He is known as a thug, a gangster in the 
area,’ Firoz Kabir, chairman of the Savar sub-district council, told the BBC. He declined to give details. 
The allegations against Mr. Rana have not been verified by the BBC, and he cannot be reached in 
custody for comment.”).  
27.  Jim Yardley, The Most Hated Man in Bangladesh: Toppled from a Shady Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/asia/bangladesh-garment-industry-reliant-
on-flimsy-oversight.html?pagewanted=all. 
28.  See Ruma Paul, Bangladesh garment factories intimidate workers over unions – group, REUTERS, Feb. 
6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/bangladesh-labour-rights-idUSL3N0LB1 
PU20140206. (“‘Some union organizers said they were beaten up, and others said they had lost their 
jobs or had been forced to resign. Factory owners sometimes used local gangsters to threaten or attack 
workers outside the workplace, including at their homes, they said,’” quoting a 2014 Human Rights 
Watch Report based on interviews of 47 workers in 21 factories). 
29.  Factory Collapse in Bangladesh, Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, Rana 
Plaza: A Look Back and Forward (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.globallabourrights.org/alerts/rana-
plaza-bangladesh-anniversary-a-look-back-and-forward.  
30.  Id. (“Eighty percent of the workers were young women, 18, 19, 20 years of age. Their 
standard shift was 13 to 14 ½ hours, from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 or 10:30 p.m., toiling 90 to 100 hours a 
week with just two days off a month.”). 
31.  Magdaleno, supra note 19.
32.  Id. (“Of those breached codes, Bhattachajee noted that municipal officials gave permission 
to add extra floors in the Rana Plaza factory without the authority to do so,” quoting Pranab Kumar 
Bhattachajee, a spokesman for the Anti-Corruption Commission). 
33.  Yardley, supra note 27.  
34.  Tansy Hiskins, Reliving the Rana Plaza factory collapse: a history of cities in 50 buildings, day 22,
THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 23, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/23/rana-plaza-
factory-collapse-history-cities-50-buildings. 
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companies included some of the largest and most well-known brands in North 
America and Europe.35 The factory owners thus stood somewhere in the middle of 
global supply chains for those products (above the farmers and the manufacturers 
of cloth) but either at the same level or below distributors, transport companies and 
warehouses, all of which occupied spaces on the supply chain below that of the 
retailers on whose behalf these efforts were ultimately undertaken.36 The owner of 
the Rana Plaza building occupied a position not directly within the supply chain but 
at a level that might be viewed as equivalent to that of the factory owners in his 
building.
Many of the apparel retailers operated through sometimes complex systems 
of oversight of operations down their supply chains.37 These generally took one of 
two main forms. The first projects behavior and conduct standards onto factory 
operators that have been developed or form part of the terms of the relationship 
between downstream manufacturers, like the factories operating in the Rana Plaza 
building, and the global apparel enterprises who hire them. These terms and 
conditions are usually written into supplier codes of conduct or similar instruments 
that form part of the arrangements between manufacturer and apparel retailers.38
The substantive elements of supplier codes of conduct generally treat issues of legal 
compliance, and beyond that of ethical conduct, labor standards and practices, 
environmental practices, human rights, and community relations.39 Indeed, to some 
35.  Id.. These included United Colors of Benetton (Italy), Cato Fashions (U.S.), Ascena Retail 
Group (U.S.); Auchan (France); Matalan (UK); Adler Modemärkte (Germany); Grabalok /Store Twenty 
One (UK); Güldenpfennig (Germany); Kids for Fashion (Germany); Manifattura Corona (Italy); NKD 
Deutschland GmbH (Germany); PWT (Texman) (Denmark); Yes Zee Essenza (Italy); JCPenney (U.S.); 
Carrefour (France); - Asda (UK); Bonmarché (UK); C&A (Dutch/German); El Corte Ingles (Spain); 
Inditex (Spain); LPP S.A. (Poland); Kik (German); Mango (Spain); Mascot (Denmark); VF Corporation 
(U.S.); Camaïeu (France); N Brown Group (UK); Premier Clothing (UK); Primark (UK); Walmart 
(U.S.); Loblaw (Canada); and The Children’s Place (U.S). 
36.  “The businesses that, directly or indirectly, provide the goods or services used by a company 
form its supply chain.” Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), Position Paper, 
“Assurance for a Sustainable Supply Chain” (June 2005), pp. 4 (¶1.1), 
http://www.fee.be/images/publications/sustainability/FEE_DP_Assurance_for_a_Sustainable_Sup
ply_Chain_050630620051934.pdf.  
37.  Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global 
Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739-84 (2007). 
38.  The Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens defines a supplier code of conduct as 
“a statement by a company of the principles underlying the conduct of its business. Ordinarily, it will 
be designed to ensure compliance with relevant laws and regulations but may be more stringent than 
those in some jurisdictions. A code may be intended for use only within a company or for application 
by its suppliers as well, with or without modification. In some instances, a supplier code of conduct 
may exist without there being a direct counterpart within the company.” Fédération des Experts 
Comptables Européens (FEE), Position Paper, “Assurance for a Sustainable Supply Chain” (June, 
2005), supra note 36 at pp. 9, ¶ 30. 
39.  Thus, for example, Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers Manuel provides: “[T]hese 
Standards for Suppliers are Walmart’s minimum expectations of Suppliers and their Factories for the 
ethical treatment of workers, workplace safety, environmental responsibility, and appropriate business 
practices. Suppliers meet these standards by upholding human rights and creating an ethical and 
sustainable supply chain.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Responsible Sourcing, Standards for Suppliers Manuel 
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extent, supplier codes harmonize practices across jurisdictions and may impose 
standards in addition to those required by local law.40 Most supplier codes also 
include provisions related to worker health and safety. Wal-Mart’s supplier code41
provides in part that “[s]uppliers must obtain valid construction approvals as 
required by applicable law. If the local law does not provide for such approvals, a 
certification by a Wal-Mart–approved third-party civil or structural engineer that the 
facility is structurally sound must be obtained.”42
Supplier codes can affect companies with no direct relation to the 
multinational enterprise. Wal-Mart, for example, defines suppliers to include “all 
manufacturing, subcontracting, packaging, packing materials facilities, and fresh 
product facilities.”43 Subcontractors of suppliers, however, may sometimes be 
difficult to police, even when supplier codes formally reach down to control the 
relationships between suppliers and their subcontractors down the supply chain.44
Multinational corporations continue to adjust their supplier codes to develop 
stronger monitoring and sanctions mechanisms to protect against subcontracting.45
That problem is sometimes resolved by monitoring supplier efforts at subcontractor 
enforcement. Alternatively, and especially where suppliers are themselves large 
multinational enterprises, it is sometimes the case that companies at the middle level 
of supply chains may also produce their own supply chains effective against the 
(Apr. 2014), pp. 2, http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/d1/7e/ee6f5c8942f69ad4183 
bc0683771/standards-for-suppliers-manual.pdf.  
40.  Wal-Mart, for example, forbids overtime in excess of generally applicable law even when 
such may be approved by local governments. Likewise, suppliers may not initiate work from home 
programs without the prior approval of Wal-Mart. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Responsible Sourcing, 
Standards for Suppliers Manuel, supra note 39 at § 3.A.4 & 5 (Labor hours), pp. 6-7. 
41.  For a discussion of Wal-Mart’s supplier code, see Haley Revak, Note: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct: Binding Contract or Ideal Publicity?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1648-52 (2012). http://www 
.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Revak-63.6.pdf.  
42.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Responsible Sourcing, Standards for Suppliers Manuel, supra note 39
§ 7.B.2 (Health & Safety; Permits and Designs), pp. 13. Special rules were provided for fire safety 
training for suppliers in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Id. at § 7.H.1.a, pp. 17. 
43.  Id. at 37 (definition of Supplier). 
44.  See MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700 R43085, BANGLADESH 
APPAREL FACTORY COLLAPSE: BACKGROUND IN BRIEF 5-6, (Jan. 10, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp 
/crs/row/R43085.pdf. As Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly note: 
Workers in this part of the sector are especially vulnerable because they are invisible to 
regulators and their employers operate on such slim margins that they cannot invest in even 
basic safety equipment or procedures. Small, under-resourced factories must rely on labor-
intensive production methods rather than making capital investments in machines and 
processes that improve efficiency. They also undercut larger, more compliant factories on 
price. Informal factories do not pay taxes, submit to regulation, or bear the costs of labor 
rights compliance. 
See SARAH LABOWITZ &AND DOROTHÉE BAUMANN-PAULY, BEYOND THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG:
BANGLADESH’S FORGOTTEN APPAREL WORKERS, supra note 11 at 23. 
45.  Wal-Mart noted on its website that “[u]nauthorized subcontracting continues to be an issue 
across the global supply chain. Because of this, we implemented policies in 2013 to address 
unauthorized subcontracting by Walmart suppliers. This includes any undisclosed subcontracting, with 
or without the supplier’s knowledge.” WalMart’s Standards for Suppliers (May 8, 2015), 
http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/ethical-sourcing/standards-for-suppliers.  
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entities from which they contract.46 That may be necessary because corporate 
supplier codes might sometimes effectively reach only to the direct relationship 
between company and supplier. Though issues of coordination are possible, most 
supplier codes tend generally to permit harmonization. 
Beyond normative standards, company supplier codes of conduct also provide 
mechanisms for monitoring, technical assistance, investigation and sanctions. At 
their most efficient, they function effectively as the law of the supply chain 
promulgated through the ultimate purchasing entity and enforced by them. 
Compliance is usually understood as a training and auditing function and is written 
into the terms of the arrangement between the multinational corporation and its 
suppliers.47 Compliance auditing is sometimes subcontracted to third parties 
enterprises specializing in supplier code auditing.48 Suppliers who fail to conform 
to the supplier conduct codes may be disciplined, up to and including loss of the 
supplier relationship.49 These are matters handled internally for the most part. While 
it is possible that such supplier codes might be enforced in courts among the parties 
to them, U.S. courts have so far refused to extend their protections to third parties, 
especially workers.50
The second also projects conduct standards onto factory operators. But in this 
case the standards are developed or certified by third party entities. The Ethical 
Training Initiative offers a base code of conduct for suppliers.51 The Fair Labor 
Association offers a code targeting workplace conduct.52 These organizations both 
develop and monitor (and certify) compliance with their standards of conduct. In 
that way they provide an arm’s length assurance of compliance.53 International 
standards might be used as a substitute for supplier codes or as a supplement. By 
2013, there were a substantial number of important public codes as well. These 
46.  Foxconn is a good example. On the one hand, it is obligated under the Apple Inc. supplier 
code of conduct for all of its operations linked to the manufacture of Apple Inc. products in its plants. 
Simultaneously, Foxconn has its own supplier code of conduct which it enforces against its own 
suppliers down its supply chain.  
47.  Revak, supra note 41 at 1652-54. 
48.  Wal-Mart, Responsible Sourcing Audit Process, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-
responsibility/ethical-sourcing/standards-for-suppliers.  
49.  Wal-Mart provides, for example, that its “[s]tandards parallel the audit standards Walmart 
uses to measure how well Suppliers are meeting requirements. If a Supplier’s factory fails to meet the 
Standards, it must take corrective action to improve its performance or the factory will not be permitted 
to supply merchandise to Walmart.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Responsible Sourcing, Standards for 
Suppliers Manuel, supra note 39 at 2. 
50.  See Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009). 
51.  Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code, Ethical Trading Initiative Respect for workers 
worldwide, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code.  
52.  Fair Labor Association Workplace Code of Conduct, Fair Labor Association, 
http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/about_us_code-of-_conduct_e1.htm.
53.  Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of Inward Self-
Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805-879 
(2013). 
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included notably the ten principles of the U.N. Global Compact,54 and the United 
Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.55 The latter developed 
an architecture of human rights due diligence56 for companies to implement in 
monitoring their behavior and those of their downstream supply chain partners 
based on the so-called International Bill of Human Rights.57
Though the factories operating in the Rana Plaza building were local 
enterprises, and in the first instance subject to the laws of Bangladesh, and in 
addition, to their contractual and societal obligations under arrangements with their 
customers (principally multinational enterprises in the garment sector), their 
operation might also be tinged with legal and policy obligations under public 
international governance regimes. Bangladesh has been a member of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1972 and ratified seven of the eight 
ILO conventions.58 Bangladesh was party to thirty bilateral investment treaties,59 all 
but six of which were in force.60 Many contain “most favored nation” provisions,61
and some include provisions that effectively could internationalize Bangladeshi 
national law to the extent it might come within coverage of the BIT.62
On Tuesday, April 23, 2013, it was reported that a number of cracks had 
appeared in the Rana Plaza building.63 “The building had been evacuated . . . but 
the workers had then been ordered back to work.”64 It is not clear what was done 
about those reports, but it was clear that on the morning of Wednesday, April 24, 
2013, many of the factory workers were aware of the cracks. They gathered outside 
the Rana Plaza building before the 8.00 A.M. starting time for work and refused to 
54.  U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.  
55.  U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (Geneva and New York, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents 
/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.  
56.  Id. at ¶¶ 17-21. 
57.  Id. at ¶ 12 (“[U]nderstood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”). 
58.  BOLLE, supra note 44 at 3.  
59.  See U.N., UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Bangladesh, http://investmentpolicyhub 
.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/16. (including most major European countries, China, the United States 
and Canada).  
60.  Among the BITs signed but not enforced were those with Denmark, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam. See id.
61.  See, e.g., U.K. Bangladesh BIT, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ 
Download/TreatyFile/277.  
62.  Thus, for example, the U.S. Bangladesh BIT provides that the “treatment, protection and 
security of investment shall be in accordance with applicable. National laws, and shall in no case be less 
than that required by international law.” Treaty Between The United States Of America And The 
People’s Republic Of Bangladesh Concerning The Reciprocal Encouragement And Protection Of 
Investment, U.S.-Bangl.,Signed Mar. 12, 1986; Entered into Force July 25, 1989, Art. II, ¶ 3, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/278.  
63.  Id.
64.  Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: Bangladesh (Labor Rights and Conditions of 
Workers), http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/bangladesh?page=2.  
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enter.65 It was reported that “3,639 workers refused to enter the eight-story Rana 
Plaza factory building because there were large and dangerous cracks in the factory 
walls. The owner . . . brought paid gang members to beat the women and men 
workers, hitting them with sticks to force them to go into the factory.”66 Others 
reported that “Rana confidently insisted the building was safe, despite the discovery 
of ominous cracks. He told 3,200 workers employed by five garment companies 
that they had nothing to worry about and should return to their jobs. ‘The building 
has minor damage. There is nothing serious,’ he insisted. ‘It will stand for a hundred 
years.’”67 Still others reported that they were told that if they did not enter the 
building they would receive no wages for the month.68 In any event, by around 8:00 
A.M., most workers had entered the building and begun their shift. At 8.45 A.M., it 
was reported that power went out in the building and a number of internal 
generators kicked in, adding substantially to the vibration of machinery in the 
building. “Almost immediately the workers felt the eight-story building begin to 
move, and heard a loud explosion as the building collapsed, pancaking downward, 
killing 1,137 workers.”69
A number of events followed the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building. 
Bangladesh moved almost immediately to personalize the collapse within the 
persons of the owner of the building and the factory owners. Mohammed Sohel 
Rana fled but was caught attempting to cross into India.70 He was arrested and 
abandoned by the political and economic elites within which they operated.71 In 
addition, the owner and the managing director of one of the largest factories within 
the Rana Plaza building were also arrested, along with two engineers tied to the 
design of the building;72 Rana’s wife and cousin were arrested as well.73 Rana was 
65.  Hiskins, supra note 34.  
66.  Factory Collapse in Bangladesh, Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, Rana 
Plaza: A Look Back and Forward, supra note 18.  
67.  Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Luke Harding, Bangladeshi garment factory death toll rises as owner 
arrested on border, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/28 
/bangladesh-garment-factory-collapse-owner-held. 
68.  Id. “Another devastated mother, Argina, says her 18-year-old daughter, Rubina, was told if 
she didn’t show up for work that day then she would not be paid for the month. She had only been 
working there for four months before she died.” Hiskins, supra note 34. 
69.  INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18 at 6.  
70.  Syed Zain Al-Mahmood and Luke Harding, Bangladeshi garment factory death toll rises as owner 
arrested on border, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr 
/28/bangladesh-garment-factory-collapse-owner-held.  
71.  Mustafa & Islam, supra note 12. (“Mohammad Sohel Rana, the owner of the building, is 
desperately trying to prove he was not to blame for the disaster on 24 April, which cost more than 500 
lives. But given his background - and the alleged history of Rana Plaza itself - he has found little 
sympathy among local Bangladeshis or the media. Even the governing Awami League (AL), with which 
he has been closely linked, has distanced itself from him.”). 
72.  Bangladesh factory owners and building engineers arrested, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/27/bangladesh-factory-owners-engineers-arrested. 
73.  Syed Zane Al-Mahmood and Shelly Banjo, Engineers Detained in Bangladesh Disaster, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873244 
74004578445991168551584. Others reported the arrest of Mr. Rana’s father.  
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eventually charged in two proceedings, one for violation of building codes in 
constructing Rana Plaza,74 and the other for loss of life.75 Additional factory owners 
were soon arrested as well, and the Bangladesh Prime Minister ordered the arrests 
of all of the five factory owners in addition to Mr. Rana.76 Efforts were made to 
confiscate Mr. Rana’s property along with that of the factory owners.77 Eventually 
forty-one people were charged with murder, including Mr. Rana, his parents, the 
factory owners, a number of officials.78 But the wheels of justice grind slowly and 
by May 2016, local courts were still attempting to set a hearing date.79
Developed states also reacted. The U.S. initially sought to manage the event 
by encouraging private enterprises to take the lead.80 In subsequent hearings shortly 
thereafter before Congress, State Department officials contextualized the Rana 
Plaza collapse, along with the then recent Tazreen factory fire,81 as examples of the 
challenges that remain for the steady improvement of conditions in Bangladesh.82
But the U.S. soon took more public actions, suspending its generalized system of 
preferences (GSP) with Bangladesh, which were in any case soon to expire,83 and 
with respect to which “[g]arment products were not included under the GSP 
74.  Tyler McCall, Building Owner to be Charged in Rana Plaza Collapse, FASHIONISTA, July 15, 2014, 
http://fashionista.com/2014/07/rana-plaza-owner-charged. Eventually an additional seventeen 
people were charged as well. Id.
75.  Bail for Rana Plaza Owner, THE DAILY STAR, Mar. 24, 2014, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/bail-for-rana-plaza-owner-16994.  
76.  Al-Mahmood & Banjo, supra note 73.  
77.  Bangladesh Court Orders Confiscation of Building Owner’s Assets, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-28/bangladesh-arrests-rana-plaza-owner-as-fire-
breaks-out-in-rubble.  
78.  Juylfikar Ali Manik and Nida Najar, Bangladesh Police Charge 41 With Murder Over Rana Plaza 
Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/world/asia/bangladesh-
rana-plaza-murder-charges.html?_r=0.
79.  See Sanaul Islam Tipu, Charge Framing in Rana Plaza Collapse Case on June 13, DHAKA
TRIBUNE, May 15, 2016, http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/may/15/charge-framing-
rana-plaza-collapse-case-june-13.  
80.  John R. Crook, U.S. Government Responds To Poor Working Conditions In Bangladesh’s Garment 
Industry, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 936, 937 (2013) (“The State Department strongly urged U.S. buyers to 
coordinate efforts with each other and with the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladesh 
Garment Manufacturers & Exporters Association (BGMEA), as well as civil society and labor groups, 
on factory safety and fire initiatives, including helping pay for independent safety and fire inspectors.”). 
81.  Anis Ahmed & Ruma Paul, More than 100 die in garment factory fire, the deadliest in Bangladesh’s 
history, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World 
/Latest-News-Wires/2012/1125/More-than-100-die-in-garment-factory-fire-the-deadliest-in-
Bangladesh-s-history.  
82.  Labor Issues in Bangladesh, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) 
(statement of Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. 
State Department), http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/210347.htm.  
83.  See, e.g., US leaves out Bangladesh from GSP, THE DAILY STAR, Aug. 11, 2015, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/country/bangladesh-left-out-gsp-125146 (“Obama suspended 
Bangladesh from GSP in June 2013 based on Bangladesh’s failure to meet statutory eligibility 
requirements related to worker rights. After two industrial disasters – Tazreen Fashions fire and Rana 
Plaza building collapse, the US suspended GSP for Bangladesh in June 2013, citing serious 
shortcomings in labour rights and workplace safety.”).  
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scheme to the U.S. market when it used to enjoy the GSP.”84 The U.S. then 
immediately began to renegotiate their terms.85 The object was to use the GSP as 
leverage to induce legal reform in Bangladesh,86 an action that had been initiated 
even before the Rana Plaza factory collapse.87 And indeed, prior to the building 
collapse the Bangladeshi government had argued that it had been making changes 
to its domestic legal order to satisfy the demand that it reflect international 
standards.88 That leverage was used continuously through 2015 to induce 
Bangladesh to effectuate a number of substantial changes to its domestic legal order 
and to the administration of laws within the national territory.89
That leverage also was presented to the Bangladesh government in the form 
of an “action plan.”90 The European Union intervened more directly. It “launched 
a joint initiative for improving conditions for workers in Bangladeshi garment 
84.  DBL Group to set up $100m garment factory in Ethiopia, THE DAILY STAR, May 27, 2016, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/business/dbl-group-set-100m-garment-factory-ethiopia-1229974. See also
Embassy of Bangladesh in the United States, U.S. – Bangladesh Trade Facts, 
http://www.bdembassyusa.org/uploads/US%20-%20BD%20trade.pdf. But note that the nature of 
globalization appears to permit Bangladeshi workers to be moved to factories built in other developing 
states that may enjoy enhanced trade preferences from the U.S. See DBL Group to set up $100m garment 
factory in Ethiopia. Id.
85.  Mike Godfrey, US Withdraws GSP Benefits from Bangladesh, Tax-News.com (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.tax-news.com/news/US_Withdraws_GSP_Benefits_From_Bangladesh____61276.html.  
86.  Rezaul Karim, US wants to know measures taken on GSP action plan, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://print.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/index.php?ref 
=MjBfMTBfMjFfMTNfMV8yXzE4NzQwNA (“‘The United States is very interested in working with 
the government of Bangladesh to restore GSP benefits at the earliest appropriate time based on 
progress made to address the items in the action plan as this plan communicates actions the USG 
encourages the government of Bangladesh to take in order to form a basis for reinstating benefits,’ the 
letter also said.”). 
87.  See US Suspends Bangladesh from Trade Preference Scheme, 17(24) Bridges (4 July 2013) 
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/us-suspends-bangladesh-from-trade-preference-scheme. “The Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative launched a review of Bangladesh’s GSP eligibility following a 2007 petition by 
the AFL-CIO labor union, which charged that the status of labor rights in Bangladesh warranted 
limitation, suspension or removal.” See also USTR To Suspend Trade Preferences For Bangladesh Over Worker 
Rights, INSIDE U.S. TRADE’S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (June 27, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/inside-
us-trade/ustr-suspend-trade-preferences-bangladesh-over-worker-rights.
88.  US Suspends Bangladesh from Trade Preference Scheme, supra note 87. (“The developing country 
has already enacted some measures to respond to international pressures for industry reform, such as 
raising the minimum wage for garment workers and allowing trade unions to be formed without the 
prior consent of factory owners, and is currently considering additional modifications to its labour 
laws.”).  
89. US leaves out Bangladesh from GSP, THE DAILY STAR, Aug. 11, 2015, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/country/bangladesh-left-out-gsp-125146 (“An interagency review led by 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) had earlier concluded that while Bangladesh made 
progress over the last year to address fire and building safety issues in the garment sector, further 
progress is needed. But, further progress is needed to get back the generalised system of preferences, 
the USTR said.”).  
90. Crook, supra note 80 at 939. (“The Bangladesh Action Plan 2013 cited in the July 2013 U.S. 
joint statement includes detailed proposals for reforms in government inspections for labor, fire and 
building standards; the ready-made garments (RMG)/knitwear sector; export processing zones; and the 
shrimp processing sector”). 
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factories. . . . The Sustainability Compact seeks to improve labour, health and safety 
conditions for workers, as well as to encourage responsible behaviour by businesses 
in the ready-made garment industry in the South Asian country.”91 This 
Sustainability Compact,92 represented a means through which the European Union, 
the International Labour Organization, multinational enterprises and civil society 
would, together with the government on Bangladesh, negotiate changes to the 
Bangladesh domestic legal order and its administration, to remedy the problems 
contributing to the factory collapse to the satisfaction of all of these parties.93 The 
United States associated itself with this effort.94
A year after the collapse, and in the wake of these well publicized activities, 
whatever the extent of their success, the Bangladeshi garment sector continued to 
thrive.95 Initially, however, there was much finger pointing. “Spanish department 
store El Corte Ingles SA confirmed its clothes were being produced at one of the 
factories in the building and said it had relied on a safety audit that had cleared the 
factory. It blamed the collapse on the failure of local authorities to monitor building 
safety.”96 The finger pointing was made more complicated because the audits were 
conducted by a third party monitoring NGOs set up for this purpose.97 There 
appears little evidence that any of the brands used the human rights due diligence 
framework of the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, though 
91.  Press Release: EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht launches Global Sustainability Compact 
in response to Bangladesh tragedy, Brussels, 8 July 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
667_en.htm.
92.  Discussed below at text and notes, see infra p. 27 and note 194. The official title of this effort 
was the “Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-
Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh.”  
93.  Id.
94.  Crook, supra note 80, at 938. 
95. Editorial Board, One Year After Rana Plaza, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/opinion/one-year-after-rana-plaza.html?_r=0. (“After Rana Plaza, 
Bangladeshi workers and officials feared that Western retailers would stop doing business in the country 
because of outrage from consumers. That would have put millions of people out of work. It didn’t 
happen. Bangladesh’s clothing exports jumped 16 percent, to $23.9 billion, in the 12 months that ended 
in March from the period a year earlier.” Id. citing to Suman Saha, Garment Exports Show Resilience, 
THE DAILY STAR, Apr. 23, 2014, http://www.thedailystar.net/garment-exports-show-resilience-
21162). See also Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, Apparel export to US sees 4.30% rise, DHAKA TRIBUNE (May 10, 
2016), http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2016/may/10/apparel-export-us-sees-430-rise (“In 
every meeting, the buyers are talking over the compliance issues, which already have seen a remarkable 
progress, but they did not increase the prices of products, said Nasir. The positive things are that the 
buyers’ confidence has been restored, he added. After the suspension of GSP or Generalized System 
of Preferences, it was feared that export to the US market, the single largest export destination of 
Bangladeshi products, especially apparel items, will see a sharp decline.”). SHIFT has used the database 
to consult with companies whose disclosure appears in the database for conformity to the UNGP.  
96.  AL-MAHMOOD & BANJO, supra note 73. 
97.  Id. (“The factory had passed an audit by the Business Social Compliance Initiative, a 
monitoring group set up by the Brussels-based Foreign Trade Association, which is supposed to 
‘monitor and improve the social and labor conditions of the supplier companies,’ a spokeswoman said. 
Local authorities are responsible for the safety of the infrastructure of industrial buildings, she said.”). 
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many did engage in some forms of managing the conduct of their suppliers.98 In 
any case, these enterprises might have been right to be cautious. On April 23, 2015, 
a lawsuit was filed in the federal district court for the District of Columbia against 
Bangladesh, JC Penny Corporation, The Children’s Place and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
seeking damages for wrongful death and negligence.99 Other suits have been filed 
in other states as well.100
But in the face of well publicized protests in developed states and the 
appearance of interest by developed states to become involved in the matter, most 
of the stakeholders whose governance structures might have been implicated in the 
collapse began working together in a variety of combinations. “In the tumultuous 
months following the collapse at Rana Plaza, the brands that had been 
manufacturing there were under tremendous public pressure to take action.”101 The 
companies and allied stakeholders representing the bulk of those affected divided 
into two camps, mostly along regional lines, the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker 
Safety102 and the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh.103 In addition, 
some sourcing companies have sought to intervene directly through their own 
98.  There are a number of emerging procedure frameworks that seek to implement the human 
rights due diligence responsibilities in the U.N. Guiding Principles. Among the more well known of 
these is the Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI). See SHIFT Human 
Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI), 
http://www.shiftproject.org/project/human-rights-reporting-and-assurance-frameworks-initiative-
rafi. In March 2016 RAFI launched a UNGP Reporting database to provide a database of corporate 
reporting under the UN Guiding Principles. See SHIFT, UNGP Reporting Database, 
http://www.ungpreporting.org/reportingdatabase/.  
99.  Abdur Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., Inc., et al., No. 15- 619 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/Rahaman%20Rana%20Plaza%20complaint.pdf.  
100.  In the U.S., see, e.g., Abdur Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., Inc., et al., CA No. N15C-07-174 
(Super. Ct. Del.) (dismissing the case for failure to meet the Bangladeshi statute of limitations May 
2016). See generally, Maria Halkias, Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney and Children’s Place sued by victims of 2013 
Bangladesh factory collapse, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 27, 2015, 
http://bizbeatblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/wal-mart-j-c-penney-and-childrens-place-sued-by-
victims-of-2013-bangladesh-factory-collapse.html/; Nick Rummell, Retailers Sued over 2013 Building 
Collapse, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (July 24, 2015, 8:43 AM PST), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2015/07/24/retailers-sued-over-2013-building-collapse.htm. In 
Canada, see, e.g., Arati Rana Das et al. v. George Weston Ltd. Et al Court File CV-15-52662800CP Fresh 
as Amended Statement of Claim (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, filed April 22, 2015), 
http://www.rochongenova.com/Fresh-as-Amended-Statement-of-Claim-filed-November-5-2015 
.pdf. See Hollie Shaw, Class action suit seeks $2 billion from Loblaw, Joe Fresh over 2013 Bangladesh garment 
factory collapse, FINANCIAL POST, Apr. 30, 2015, http://business.financialpost.com/news/retail-
marketing/class-action-suit-seeks-2-billion-from-loblaw-joe-fresh-over-2013-bangladesh-garment-
factory-collapse.  
101.  Lydia DePillis, Two Years Ago, 1,129 People Died in a Bangladesh Factory Collapse. The Problems 
Still Haven’t Been Fixed, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/23/two-years-ago-1129-people-died-in-a-bangladesh-factory-collapse-the-
problems-still-havent-been-fixed/.  
102. About the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, 
http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/who-we-are/about-the-alliance.  
103.  Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, http://bangladeshaccord.org/.  
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programs with suppliers.104 While these programs are aimed at suppliers with a 
direct connection to multinational enterprise members, they appear as yet to do little 
to reach the more opaque system of subcontracting factories established around 
Bangladesh.105
The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (the “Alliance”) is the project of 
North American multinational enterprises, the establishment of which was 
announced on July 10, 2013.106 The Alliance was formed by a group of North 
American apparel companies and retailers,107 numbering twenty-eight in July 
2015.108 The Alliance operates through a Member Agreement,109 and associated 
104.  Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Alliance Sets Plan to Finance Bangladesh Factory Upgrades, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alliance-sets-plan-to-finance-bangladesh-factory-
upgrades-1417791607.  
105.  DePillis, supra note 101. (“Even if they do fix the factories where they have contracts, 
however, they may not reach the whole industry. Although the government has registered only about 
3,400 factories, Sarah Labowitz, director of the Center for Business and Human Rights at New York 
University, has estimated that there are closer to 6,000—many of them smaller buildings that 
subcontract with the larger companies when big orders come in.”). 
106.  The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety: Statement of Purpose by Leaders of the 
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, July 10, 2013, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files 
/CEO-Letter-7.9-CR-11pm.pdf (includes list of original members). 
107.  “The Alliance was organized through the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) with discussions 
convened and chaired by former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) and former U.S. 
Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), . . . [involving] apparel industry companies and stakeholders including: 
the U.S. and Bangladeshi governments; policymakers; NGOs; members of civil society; and organized 
labor. “ About Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/who-
we-are/about-the-alliance.
108.  About Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org 
/who-we-are/membership?lang=en. These included: Ariela and Associates International LLC; Bon 
Worth; Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited; Carter’s Inc.; The Children’s Place Retail Stores Inc.; 
Costco Wholesale Corporation; Fruit of the Loom, Inc.; Gap Inc.; Giant Tiger; Hudson’s Bay 
Company; IFG Corp.; Intradeco Apparel; J.C. Penney Company Inc.; Jordache Enterprises, Inc.; The 
Just Group; Kate Spade & Company; Kohl’s Department Stores; L. L. Bean Inc.; M. Hidary & Company 
Inc.; Macy’s; Nine West Holdings, Inc.; Nordstrom Inc.; Public Clothing Company; Sears Holdings 
Corporation; Target Corporation; VF Corporation; and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; YM Inc. In addition, the 
Alliance includes a number of supporting associations: American Apparel & Footwear Association, 
BRAC, Canadian Apparel Federation, National Retail Federation, Retail Council of Canada, Retail 
Industry Leaders Association, and United States Association of Importers of Textiles & Apparel. “Li 
& Fung, a major Hong Kong-based sourcing company which does business with many members of the 
Alliance, will serve in an advisory capacity.” Id. The original membership in 2013 was seventeen. See
Press Release, Alliance of Leading Retailers in North America Join Forces in Comprehensive, Five-
Year Commitment to Improve Factory Safety Conditions for Workers in Bangladesh. (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/alliance-of-leading-retailers-in-north-america-joins-
forces-in-comprehensive-five-year-commitment-to-improve-factory-safety-conditions-for-workers-in-
bangladesh-214897421.html. (“including list of founding companies.”).  
109.  Alliance Membership Agreement, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files 
/Alliance-Member-Agreement-FINAL.pdf.
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bylaws.110 Membership in the Alliance is binding, as between the Members and the 
organization over the course of a member’s five year commitment.111
The Membership Agreement committed member companies to a set of 
specific goals. First, each was to contribute to a Worker Safety Fund (WSF) to 
underwrite factor based fire and building safety initiatives applicable to factories 
from which member company sources products.112 The WSF provides support for 
mandatory fire and building safety training, assessments of fire and building safety 
inspections and audits, coordination of readiness efforts among members, and the 
maintenance of personal worker safety and empowerment hotlines.113 Members 
might also contribute to an Affordable Capital for Building Safety (ACBS) fund.114
Factory owners within their respective supply chains would be able to seek loans 
from funds donated of their donating Member. 
Second, Alliance members would work to create Worker Participation 
Committees in all Alliance member factories to encourage worker reporting of fire 
and safety violations.115 WPC would be audited to ensure their independence and 
the democratic election of its members.116 Members would develop systems for 
ensuring anonymous reporting.117 Third, members will ensure that workers and 
managers in factories manufacturing for Alliance Members undergo training for fire 
110.  Bylaws of The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Inc., 
http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-Bylaws-FINAL.pdf. The Member Agreement 
was amended twice. See Member Agreement Amendment I (Apr. 14, 2014) http://www 
.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-Member-Agreement-Amendment-1.pdf. (“Members shall 
require that the Factories they work with respect the right of a worker to refuse work if he/she has a 
reasonable justification to believe that a safety situation presents an imminent and serious danger to 
his/her life, and that such worker shall be protected from undue consequences, in accordance with the 
relevant ILO Conventions and Bangladeshi Law”); See Member Agreement Amendment 2 (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/Alliance-Member-Agreement-Amendment-2 
.pdf (identification of factories approved for production, Corrective Action Plan for factories failing 
inspection; follow up inspections). 
111.  Alliance FAQ, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/en/who-we-are/faq 
(“Membership to the Alliance is a five-year commitment – and the agreement and its terms that are 
legally binding on all of its Members. The Alliance Board of Directors – chaired by an Independent 
Director – has the authority to seek binding arbitration against any Member who does not satisfy its 
obligations under the agreement, and to publicly expel them for failure to abide by other commitments 
set forth in the Members Agreement.”). 
112.  Alliance Membership Agreement, supra note 109, at §2.2. Contributions were based on a 
tiered fee structure tied to Member sourcing activity in Bangladesh. The goal was to eventually raise 
about $50 million from members. Members might also make in kind contributions within their own 
supply chains, id. at §2.3. 
113.  Id. at § 2.2(b). A 10% reserve fund was to be established to support temporarily displaced 
workers due to Factory remediation efforts under the programs. 
114.  Id. at §2.3.1.  
115.  Id. at §3.2. 
116.  Id. at §4.2.b.iv. 
117.  Id. at §3.1. 
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and building safety.118 The Alliance would also develop a uniform fire and safety 
training curriculum119 to review and approve qualified trainers.120
Fourth, the Alliance agreed to establish a common standard for assessing fire 
and building safety, “based on existing protocols and initiatives, and that meets or 
exceeds local legal requirements.”121 This Alliance Fire and Building Safety 
Standards would be made public and applied to all buildings in which Members’ 
products are sourced.122 But some NGOS have criticized the looser resulting 
standards, especially as compared to those from other groups of multinationals123
Fifth, the Alliance Fire and Building Safety would be applied by independent 
Qualified Inspectors,124 in accordance with a process developed by the Alliance.125
The immediate objective was to ensure that all factories in Bangladesh that source 
for Members would be inspected by July 10, 2014.126 So called at-risk factories 
would be given an opportunity to remediate, or in the worst cases, reported to the 
government for shut down.127 Lastly, the Alliance Members would be committed 
to a program of transparency,128 and to prohibit unauthorized subcontracting.129 By 
the time of its first annual report, the Alliance was able to list progress on most 
objectives.130 But NGOs monitoring NGOs continue to criticize members of the 
Alliance for their failure to effectively police subcontracting policies and rules.131
118.  Id. at §4.1. 
119.  Id. at §4.2. 
120.  Id.
121.  Id. at § 5.1. 
122.  Id. at § 5.2. 
123.  See Clean Clothes Campaign, Comparison: The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 
and the Gap/Walmart scheme (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/background 
/comparison-safety-accord-and-the-gap-walmart-scheme.  
124.  Alliance Membership Agreement, supra note 109, at § 6.1. 
125.  Id. at § 6.2. 
126.  Id. at § 6.2( c). 
127.  Id. at § 6.2. 
128.  Id. at § 7. 
129.  Id. at § 8. 
130.  Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Protecting the Lives and Livelihoods of 
Bangladesh’s Garment Workers: First Annual Report of the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety 
(July 2014), http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/2014-annual-report/Alliance%20Annual 
%20Report,%202014.pdf. The Report noted that all 587 Alliance member factories had been inspected 
under the new standards, and 10 factories fully or partially closed, with an additional 50% of inspected 
factories in remediation. It also noted that over 1 million workers had been trained in basic fire safety. 
The Alliance Report explained that $100 million had been committed to affordable capital loans 
programs, and $5 million raised to support displaced workers, for which 1,000 workers had been 
compensated. Id. at § 7. 
131.  See Michelle Chan, This is What Goes Into Your Cheap T-Shirt, THE NATION (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/this-is-what-goes-into-your-cheap-t-shirt/ (“There are also 
reported cases of Walmart subcontractors actively flouting pro-worker reforms. Among Bangladeshi 
Walmart supply-chain workers, despite recently implemented overtime rules, most interviewees 
‘considered overtime wage rates to be at the discretion of the employer—suggesting widespread 
irregularity in overtime remuneration paid.’”). 
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The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (the “Accord”), like 
the Alliance, was formed to aid in fire and building safety and inspections.132 It also 
was based on a “legally binding agreement between brands and trade unions 
designed to work towards a safe and healthy Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment 
Industry,”133 which was entered into on May 15, 2013.134 Like the Alliance, its basic 
objectives were built around the creation of an independent inspection program, 
public disclosure, the creation of a fund to help factory remediation efforts, the 
creation of democratically elected safety and health committees, and worker 
empowerment through training programs and the institution of complaint 
mechanisms.135 The basic goal of the Accord was to “establish a fire and building 
safety program in Bangladesh for a period of five years”136 The objectives were to 
be reached through programs of credible inspections,137 remediation,138 training,139
the institution of a complaint process,140 and programs of training and 
transparency.141 But unlike the Alliance, the Accord appeared to place more 
emphasis on providing supplier incentives through contract terms between supplier 
and global retailer.142 The Accord is “committed to working with all relevant 
stakeholders including members of the Alliance, to ensure a safe and sustainable 
Bangladeshi Ready Made Garment industry.”143
The Accord includes a broader membership base than the Alliance, with apex 
production chain enterprises from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
132.  For a discussion on the Accord, see Benjamin A. Evans, Note, Accord on Fire and Building 
Safety in Bangladesh: An International Response to Bangladesh Labor Conditions, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 597 (2015). 
133.  ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http://bangladeshaccord 
.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). Commentators have noted that part of the reason that several of the 
largest U.S. retailers refused to sign onto the Accord was because they objected to the binding nature 
of the agreement, and especially its obligations to make payments to help pay for Factory remediation 
and other expenses. The Alliance Membership Agreement is equally binding, but the members are 
bound to a smaller set of terms. See MARY JANE BOLLE, BANGLADESH APPAREL FACTORY COLLAPSE,
supra note 44, at 10-11. 
134.  About the Accord, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH,
http://bangladeshaccord.org/about/.  
135.  BANGLADESH ACCORD SECRETARIAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE ACCORD ON FIRE AND 
BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH
(2015), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/Brochure-about-the-Accord.pdf.  
136.  See Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, May 13, 2013, 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf.  
137.  Id. at ¶¶ 8-11. 
138.  Id. at ¶¶ 12-15. 
139.  Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 
140.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
141.  Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.  
142.  See, e.g., id, ¶¶ 21–23 (noting at ¶ 22 “[P]articipating brands and retailers will negotiate 
commercial terms with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to 
maintain safe workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the 
Safety Inspector.”).
143.  See Accord, FAQs, http://bangladeshaccord.org/about/faqs/.  
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the U.S.144 Also, unlike 
the Alliance, the Accord’s governance structures parallels the tripartite organization 
of the ILO (government, labor, and business), with a Steering Committee at its head, 
comprised of equal representation of signatory companies and trade unions, 
presided over by a chair provided by the ILO.145 NGOs also participate, but 
indirectly.146 The Accord represents about 190 brands sourcing in over 1600 
factories employing more than 2 million workers.147 “The Accord is governed by a 
Steering Committee with equal representation of the signatory companies and trade 
unions with a neutral Chair provided by the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO).”148 Its bylaws mirror those of the Alliance.149 An Advisory Board, consisting 
of representatives of brands and retailers, suppliers, governments, trade unions, and 
NGOs was also created.150 Contributions were assessed on the basis of volume of 
business in Bangladesh,151 though there appears to be a greater obligation for 
sourcing companies to fund repairs.152 Maximum contributions were set at $500,000 
per year.153
On the basis of the inspection standards developed and applied by the Accord, 
it was reported that almost 1500 inspections had been made, with more to follow.154
Those inspection standards were developed as part of a common approach 
coordinated with Bangladeshi national authorities.155 A number of downstream 
manufacturers in Bangladesh has been terminated and excluded from participation 
in global garment production chains with Accord members, until it meets the 
conditions for requalification.156 At least within that group of downstream 
144.  See Accord, Signatories, http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/.  
145.  See Accord, Governance, http://bangladeshaccord.org/governance/.  
146.  FAQs, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http:// 
bangladeshaccord.org/about/faqs/.  
147. Progress Overview, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http:// 
bangladeshaccord.org/progress/. 
148. Governance, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, http:// 
bangladeshaccord.org/governance-policies/. 
149.  Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh Regulations, adopted 24 Sept. 2013, 
amended 10 July 2014, http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/Governance-Regulations 
.pdf.
150.  ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 149. 
151.  FAQs, supra note 146.  
152.  Id.
153.  ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supra note 149, at ¶ 24. 
154.  Progress overview, supra note 147.  
155.  BANGLADESH SUSTAINABILITY COMPACT: TECHNICAL STATUS REPORT, EUROPEAN 
UNION 28 (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153390.pdf.
156.  Accord, Terminated Suppliers, http://bangladeshaccord.org/terminated-suppliers/ (“A 
terminated factory may requalify for placement of business by an Accord signatory company after a 
period of no less than 24 months from the date of termination.”). See also Accord, Statement on 
Termination of Accord Companies’ Business With Young International (May 26, 2016), 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/160524-Termination-of-Business-statement-
Young-International.pdf. (“Accord engineers determined new, immediate, urgent safety concerns 
which necessitated temporary suspension of production and evacuation of the building. However, the 
factory refused to evacuate the main building in their compound which was deemed to have significant 
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manufacturers who participate within Accord member production chains, the 
Accord itself has become a significant regulator of building safety and the most 
significant source of governance in that respect.157 In addition, the Accord shares 
the Alliance’s position on unauthorized subcontracting but appears more willing to 
accept the reality of the practice, providing that all such subtracting arrangements 
will lead to facilities inspection.158 There is a grudging willingness to work with the 
Alliance, though it is clear that the two organizations view themselves as distinct 
and competitive.159
Beyond the work of the Accord and the Alliance, additional orders were 
established to govern the issue of compensation—which became known as the 
“Arrangement.”160 Like the development of fire and safety standards, the 
implementation of programs for the compensation of the victims of the Rana Plaza 
factory building was established through public-private multi-lateral efforts in which 
the state of Bangladesh played a diminished role. In September 2013, a Rana Plaza 
Coordination Committee161 was established to administer the “Arrangement.”162
The Rana Plaza Committee was made up of representatives from the Ministry of 
Labour of the Government of Bangladesh, local and international garment 
structural issues. The factory further refused to cooperate fully and allow access to Accord engineers to 
verify evacuation of the factory.”). See also Accord, Statement on the termination of Accord signatory 
companies’ business relations with M-Yew Fashion Ltd, 52, Shahid Tajuddin Ahmed Sharoni, 
Mohakhali, Dhaka, Bangladesh., due to the supplier’s failure to implement workplace safety measures 
(May 18, 2016), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/160518-Termination-of-Business-
statement-M-Yew-Fashion-Ltd.pdf; see also Accord, Statement on the termination of Accord signatory 
companies’ business relations with Padma Sweaters Litd, 1/B Darus Salam Road, Section 1, Mirpur, 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, due to the supplier’s failure to implement workplace safety measures (May 18, 
2016), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/160518-Termination-of-Business-
statement-Padma-Sweaters-Ltd.pdf. 
157.  Thus consider the regulatory effect of the reinstatement procedures: 
To requalify after such period, the factory is required to demonstrate that all remediation 
from the Accord initial inspection has been satisfactorily completed and that an acceptable, 
time bound corrective action plan is in place to correct any new findings identified after the 
initial inspection. It shall be the Accord Chief Safety Inspector who determines if initial 
remediation has been satisfactorily completed through an Accord verification inspection. 
The onus shall be on the terminated factory, after the above-described 24 month period, to 
inform the Accord CSI that remediation has been completed and to request an Accord 
verification inspection. 
Accord, Terminated Suppliers, http://bangladeshaccord.org/terminated-suppliers/.  
158.  FAQs, supra note 146. (“Unauthorised sub-contracting is one of the many recognised 
challenges for the Accord and it is impossible for the Accord alone to end the practice of unauthorised 
subcontracting. Where factories of unauthorised subcontractors are identified and confirmed as 
supplying an Accord signatory, they will be subject to the same process of inspection as primary 
suppliers.”). 
159.  Id. (“We urge all brands to join the Accord as it provides a tripartite, transparent, and 
robust governance structure and mechanism. However, we are committed to working with all relevant 
stakeholders including members of the Alliance, to ensure a safe and sustainable Bangladeshi Ready 
Made Garment industry.”). 
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industry,163 local and international trade unions,164 and local and international non-
governmental organisations.165 The International Labour Organisation “acts as a 
neutral and independent chair.”166 The Accord has supported the Arrangement and 
urged its members to contribute to the Fund established for payouts through it.167
And civil society has focused pressure on those multinational enterprises that have 
refused to contribute.168
The objective of the Rana Plaza Committee was to develop “a comprehensive 
and independent process that would deliver support to the victims, their families 
and dependents in a predictable manner.”169 The process might be grounded in the 
laws of Bangladesh, but only to the extent those might be “consistent with 
international labor standards.”170 This formula appears to import the language and 
sensibilities of bilateral investment treaties, which have moved toward a regulatory 
basis grounded in internationalized national law.171 This approach changes the 
relationship between law and the interested parties. It is to some extent and from 
the perspective of sourcing companies and their home states, internationalization 
serves as a sword, one meant to smooth over the unique preferences of Bangladeshi 
law in the service of global consistency. But equally important, perhaps, it also seems 
to serve Bangladeshi leaders as a shield, protecting them, to a certain extent, from 
accountability by their electorate.172
163. Governance, RANA PLAZA ARRANGEMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/mou/governance. These included Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers’ Association (BGMEA), Bangladesh Employers Federation (BEF), El Corte Ingles, 
Loblaw, and Primark. 
164.  Id. These included IndustriALL Bangladesh Council (IBC), National Coordination 
Committee for Workers’ Education (NCCWE), and IndustriALL Global Union. 
165.  Id. These included Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies (BILS), and Clean Clothes 
Campaign (CCC).  
166.  Id.
167.  Statement from the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Accord) regarding the Rana 
Plaza Arrangement, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/2014/03/rana-plaza-arrangement/. Almost a year after the Rana Plaza 
factory building collapse the Accord issued a statement that explained: “The Accord believes that the 
joint approach agreed by the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee, which includes also the Bangladesh 
Ministry of Labour, the BGMEA and BEF, is a role model for a temporary compensation structure in 
the absence of a long term solution.”  
168.  See, e.g., International Labor Rights Forum, Press Release: Pressure increases on Benetton 
as nearly 1 million activists demand they immediately pay into Rana Plaza victims’ compensation fund, 
(Feb. 11, 2015), http://laborrights.org/releases/pressure-increases-benetton-nearly-1-million-activists-
demand-they-immediately-pay-rana (Benetton). 
169.  Governance, supra note 163.  
170.  Id. (“The Arrangement provides a single approach for establishing the amount of financial 
support and level of medical care to be provided to the victims of the disaster, consistent with 
international labour standards concerning employment injury benefits (ILO Convention No.121).”).  
171.  For a discussion, see, e.g., PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE 
LAW 579-83 (Oxford, 2007).  
172.  See Families of 104 Missing Rana Plaza Workers to Get Help, BDNEWS24.COM (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/04/24/families-of-104-missing-rana-plaza-workers-to-get-
help. (“Commerce Secretary Hedayetullah Al Mamoon said there was propaganda in and outside 
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To aid in the effort, an international Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund was 
established.173 The Trust Fund is managed by the International Labour 
Organization.174 Through April 2015, it has received donations of about $14 
Million, much of which has come from companies sourcing in Bangladesh and 
involved in the leadership of either the Alliance or the Accord.175 The amount of 
these contributions have been criticized by Western NGOs.176 A little less than $2.5 
million has been made available through the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s Relief and 
Welfare Fund.177 A little less than $10 million has been paid out in claims.178 And 
record keeping remains a problem.179 Moreover, it remains to be seen the effect, if 
any, of the litigation against companies sourcing product in Bangladesh will have on 
these efforts.180 In May 2016, the Delaware Superior Court rebuffed efforts to bring 
Bangladesh regarding the compensation. ‘That is still going on. We’ve given compensation by adhering 
to the international standards. Our factories are also complying with international norms,’ he said.”). 
173.  Press Release, Rana Plaza Coordination Committee, The Rana Plaza Coordination 
Committee Pays Out BDT 76 Crore (USD 9.84 million) to the Injured and the Family Members of 
Deceased and Missing Workers of Rana Plaza Building Collapse ¶16, (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/news/Press%20Release%2020%20April%202015_Final.pdf; 
The Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund, RANA PLAZA ARRANGEMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/fund. It is hoped that the Trust Fund generates about $30 
million to cover expected claims. RPCC Revises Estimate on Funding Target, RANA PLAZA ARRANGEMENT 
COORDINATION COMMITTEE, http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/news/rpcc-revises-estimate-
on-funding-target.  
174.  Id. 
175. See Donors, RANA PLAZA ARRANGEMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE,
http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/fund/donors.  
176.  “Activist groups say that donations from brands like the Children’s Place and Benetton 
are inadequate, relative to the business they did in the two factories before the collapse. So on Friday, 
they’re launching protests in dozens of cities across Europe and the United States urging the companies 
to pay up. ‘The apparel brands that were buyers at Rana Plaza were unwilling to adopt a formula 
requiring themselves to pay in particular amounts, and so it has required public campaigning to urge 
companies to pay in,’ says Liana Foxvog, head of organizing at the International Labor Rights Forum.” 
DePillis, supra note 101. NGOs have been more direct: “A number of globally recognised brands, all 
with links to the Rana Plaza factories have so far refused to provide adequate payments into the Fund. 
Amongst the worst offenders is Benetton, who is yet to pay a penny into the Fund. Others including 
Walmart, Mango and The Children’s Place are being singled out for making donations that fall far short 
of expectations. Other companies still to pay the required amount include Lee Cooper, JC Penny, 
Matalan and Kik.” See also Press Release, Clean Clothes Campaign, Rana Plaza: Countdown to Second 
Anniversary Begins with Compensation Fund Still $9 Million Short (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/press-releases/2015/03/24/rana-plaza-countdown-to-second-
anniversary-begins-with-compensation-fund-still-9-million-short.  
177.  DePillis, supra note 101. 
178.  Press Release, Rana Plaza Coordination Committee, supra note 173. 
179.  Two years after the collapse the identification of victims remains contested and unsure. 
See Aditya Tejas, Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza Factory Collapse: Two Years On, Victims Remain in the Dark,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 24, 2015, 2:17 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/bangladeshs 
-rana-plaza-factory-collapse-two-years-victims-remain-dark-1895180. (“There have been conflicting 
reports about the number of victims the government has failed to identify; the Daily Star reports that 
the Bangladeshi government lacks information about 85 victims, while the Agence France-Presse (AFP) 
reports that 135 remain unaccounted for.”). 
180.  See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Abdur Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., Inc., et al., No. 15-
619 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2065618/rahaman-rana-
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litigation to the home jurisdictions of the brands—rejecting application of U.S. law 
on choice of law grounds and indicating doubts about the legal basis of the 
substantive claims.181
NGOs and local individuals continue to complain about a number of aspects 
of the Arrangement.182The compensation framework has been faulted for 
undervaluing the loss of injured or dead workers.183 The Arrangement and related 
remediation efforts have also been faulted because they provide only compensation 
for lost income and medical expenses.184 The process was also faulted for the 
burden placed in victims’ families in the claims process.185 The Arrangement Claims 
Form, running about eight pages, suggests both the efforts made to avoid 
complexity and the burdens that have been placed on those seeking compensation. 
The instructions run a page.186 Help in filling out the claims form was offered, but 
plaza-complaint.pdf.; Abdur Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., Inc., et al., CA No. N15C-07-174 (Super. Ct. 
Del.).  
181. See Abdur Rahaman v. JC Penny Corp., Inc., et al., CA No. N15C-07-174 (Super. Ct. Del.) 
Memorandum Opinion on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at p. 13, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=240380 (applying Delaware choice of law 
rules to determine that Bangladesh’s statute of limitations barred the suit, and rejecting the notion that 
defendants owed any duty to plaintiffs under Delaware law, applying Doe I v. Walmart Stores, 572 F.3d 
677 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
182.  Families of 104 Missing Rana Plaza Workers to Get Help, BDNEWS24.COM, Apr. 24, 2015, 
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/04/24/families-of-104-missing-rana-plaza-workers-to-get-
help.
183.  See, e.g., Michelle Chen, $1,000 for a Dead Family Member—Is That Justice for Bangladesh’s 
Garment Workers?, THE NATION (June 3, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/1000-dead-family-
member-justice-bangladeshs-garment-workers/. 
184.  See Adria Vasil, Joe Fresh faces class action over Bangladesh disaster, NOW TORONTO (May 6, 
2015), https://nowtoronto.com/news/ecoholic/joe-fresh-faces-class-action-over-bangladesh-disaster 
/. (“Maquila Solidarity Network’s Bob Jeffcott . . . adds, ‘“the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund only 
provides compensation for lost income and medical expenses and doesn’t offer anything for the pain 
and suffering of seriously injured workers and the families of those killed.’”). 
185.  Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, No Compensation Given Yet to 13 Missing Rana Plaza Workers, DHAKA
TRIBUNE (Apr. 24, 2015, 12:47 AM) http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2015/apr/24 
/no-compensation-given-yet-13-missing-rana-plaza-workers (“‘We’ve included the missing workers, 
who were able to present minimum documents to prove them as workers,’ Ramesh Chandra Roy, 
secretary general of IndustriAll Bangladesh Council and member of the coordination committee, told 
the Dhaka Tribune. He also said: ‘If a genuine missing worker was not included in the list, we will 
provide them compensation as per the rules if their families could claim with proper documents.’”) 
186.  The Claim Form Instructions read in full as follows: 
 (1) The Rana Plaza Claims Administration is an exclusive scheme set up and authorized by 
the multi-stakeholder Rana Plaza Coordination Committee. The purpose of the scheme is 
to provide fair and quick compensation to the victims of Rana Plaza collapse and their 
families in a transparent manner. 
(2) This form is therefore applicable only to those who suffered personal injury (i.e., any 
injury not fully recovered at the time of submitting the claim), or whose spouse, child, 
parents or other close relative died or disappeared, as a result of Rana Plaza collapse on 24th 
April 2013 in Savar-Bangladesh. 
(3) You will receive assistance to submit your claim on this form. Your claim will be reviewed 
in order to determine the amounts to be allocated to your claim. Compensation will only be 
awarded if your claim is approved by the Commissioners. A local bank will be in charge of 
distributing payments to claimants and/or investing funds for the benefit and on behalf of 
claimants in accordance with the Coordination Committee approval and instructions based 
on post-award assessment needs of the victims. 
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documentation requirements were not insignificant, especially as they might require 
very poor people employed substantially all day long to navigate Bangladeshi 
bureaucracies in order to obtain required documents. Nothing is said about the 
additional impediments that fees for such documents might pose for the claimants. 
Yet, some authenticated verification is necessary for claims. And the state still sits 
at the center of the nexus of data that give people an acknowledgement of their 
formal existence, the nature of their relation to the state and to each other. But the 
state itself can pose the greatest obstacle to reliance on its systems of authentication 
and documentation. Even more difficult might be the obligation to provide 
evidence of employment relationship with the factory owners. Work contracts, 
salary slips or worker IDs might be hard to obtain; and, in the event of loss, harder 
to obtain duplicates from factory owners jailed on account of the collapse. These 
difficulties were ameliorated, in part, by efforts of the sourcing companies 
themselves.187
The Arrangement is not the only effort to provide a framework for 
compensation created outside the legal apparatus of the state. Other production 
chain apex corporations, whose branded garments were manufactured or assembled 
in Rana Plaza also provided ad hoc arrangements for compensation.188 Primark, a 
European retailer provides a good example of these efforts. Primark describes these 
efforts on its web site: “Immediately after the disaster Primark worked with local 
partners in Bangladesh to give financial support and food aid to the victims and 
their families. At the time, we also committed to providing long-term 
(4) Attach documentation confirming your identity, such a s photocopy of your national 
identity card , birth certificate or certificate from UP Chairman. If this is a family claim, 
attach same documentation confirming the identity of all family members. 
 (5) Attach documentation, such as photocopy of a work contract, salary slip, or worker ID 
to show the employment relationship and the last salary of the injured deceased, or missing 
person. 
(6) Attach documentation, such as photocopy of a marriage document, birth certificate, heir 
certificate or dependent certificate issued by UP Chairman, to show family relationship of 
claimant(s) to the deceased or missing person. 
 (7) Attach documentation that you may have concerning the nature and seriousness of your 
personal injury. You will undergo a medical assessment to establish the degree of disability 
and cases requiring urgent medical treatment. 
(8) Attach documentation, such as photocopy of a death or burial certificate, or certificate 
issued by UP Chairman, to show the place and date of death; and the national identity card 
of the deceased or other documents to show her date of birth. 
(9) Attach the national identity card of the missing relative or other documents to show her 
date of birth, any documentation that you may have on the circumstances of the 
disappearance, and a witness testimony signed under oath by minimum 4 persons who knew 
and worked with the missing person.  
CLAIM FORM FOR PERSONAL INJURY, DEATH, OR DISAPPEARANCE AS A RESULT OF RANA PLAZA 24
APRIL 2013 COLLAPSE, RANA PLAZA CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ranaplaza-
arrangement.org/mou/claims/claims-form-english.
187.  Id.
188.  See, e.g., Adria Vasil, Joe Fresh faces class action over Bangladesh disaster, NOW TORONTO (May 
6, 2015), https://nowtoronto.com/news/ecoholic/joe-fresh-faces-class-action-over-bangladesh-
disaster/ (Canadian MNE Loblaw Companies Ltd “said that it’s contributed “more than its share,” 
noting that it has spent $5 million on relief and compensation commitments and is the only Canadian 
clothing company to have signed the Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh.”).  
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compensation.”189 By March 31, 2015, Primark announced that it had remediated 
damage to its downstream laborers, at least to its satisfaction.190 A total of roughly 
$14 million in payments were made. Primark stated that payments were made on a 
basis of a process founded on medical and vulnerability assessments with substantial 
liaison with the ILO.191 Primark contributed more modest funds to the 
Arrangement (about $1 million) and an additional $3 million in other aid to 
workers.192 It appears that the object of this direct remediation approach was to 
focus funding within the apex corporation’s own supply chain and to avoid or 
minimize compensation “for distribution to workers in its competitors’ supply 
chain.”193
One other public multi-lateral effort is worth mentioning. In July 2013, the 
European Union and Bangladesh announced agreement on a “sustainability 
compact.”194 This compact focused on the reform of labor laws and effective 
enforcement of labor rights in Bangladesh and includes the active participation of 
representatives of the ILO.195 In particular, Bangladesh committed to a substantial 
reform of its labor laws, agreed that such reform be in compliance with ILO rules, 
procedures and practices, agreed further to ILO consultation before legislative 
changes, enhancing compliance inspections to ensure ILO standards for freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, committing to education and training 
programs, achieving eligibility for the Better Work Programme between the ILO 
and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, increasing the 
number of labor inspectors, developing a public database for reporting labor, fire, 
and building safety inspections.196 Bangladesh also committed to assess the 
structural integrity of all export oriented garment factories by June 2014 and develop 
189.  Primark, Rana Plaza, http://www.primark.com/en/our-ethics/news/rana-plaza. Primark 
worked through local NGOs and its Bengladeshi supplier, New Wave Bottoms. Aid included limited 
short term material support as well. “We gave emergency food parcels to over 1265 households for five 
weeks in partnership with a local NGO. Each package contained enough dry food for a family of four 
for one week, and included rice, dal, potatoes, biscuits, tea, oil, sugar, and salt.”  






194.  Joint Statement: Staying Engaged: A Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour 
Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh, Geneva, Switzerland
(July 8, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151601.pdf.  
195.  EU, Bangladesh Agree on “Sustainability Compact” in Wake of Factory Collapse, Bridges (July 11, 
2013), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-bangladesh-agree-on-sustainability-
compact-in-wake-of-factory-collapse. In particular, the Compact focused on respect for labor rights, 
structural integrity of factory buildings and responsible business conduct by all stakeholders. Joint
Statement: Staying Engaged: A Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory 
Safety in the Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh, supra note 194, at 2-3. 
196.  Joint Statement: Staying Engaged: A Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour 
Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh, id. at 3-5. 
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a public database to disclose the results of inspection.197 The European Union, for 
its part, committed to technical assistance and to the extension of the EU’s BEST 
program with Bangladesh.198 The three also acknowledged the utility of the Accord 
(but not the Alliance) and the need to foster regimes of responsible business 
conduct by global enterprises.199 The Technical Status Report on the Sustainability 
Compact noted substantial progress by Bangladesh,200 but also warned of 
difficulties in implementation and the inability of Bangladesh to extend legal 
protection to workers within Export Processing Zones.201 On the second 
anniversary of the Rana Plaza building collapse, Bangladesh was applauded for 
making extensive progress in many of these areas,202 but “significant work remains 
to be done under the Sustainability Compact to realize its goals.”203 Much of that 
remaining work was detailed in a report issued in April 2015 by Human Rights 
Watch.204
Multinational enterprises sourcing product in Bangladesh also moved to 
modify their supplier codes of conduct. Some developed very specific governance 
regimes applicable to products sourced in Bangladesh. Wal-Mart, for example, 
developed a specialized framework for responsible sourcing in Bangladesh.205 The 
changes paralleled and incorporated the approach adopted by the Alliance, of which 
Wal-Mart was a founding member.206 And it pointed to greater engagement with 
local stakeholders through the Women in Factories Training Program,207 donations 
197.  Id. at 5-7 
198.  Id. at 7. 
199.  Id. at 7-8. 
200.  BANGLADESH SUSTAINABILITY COMPACT: TECHNICAL STATUS REPORT, supra note 155, 
at 2.  
201.  Id. at 3. 
202.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release: Joint Statement on the Anniversary of 
Rana Plaza Building Collapse in Bangladesh (Apr. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2015/april/joint-statement-anniversary-rana.  
203.  Id. (“In particular, we encourage and support the Government of Bangladesh’s efforts to 
continue reforming its labor laws, in close consultations with the ILO, complete the safety inspections 
of all RMG factories and continue to register unions in a timely and transparent way. We urge the 
government to issue –without further delays– the implementing rules for Bangladesh Labor Act, 
consistent with international labor standards. Similarly, we call upon the Government of Bangladesh to 
enact legislation on economic processing zones that ensures workers inside the zones enjoy rights 
commensurate with those outside the zones.”). 
204.  Human Rights Watch, Whoever Raises Their Head, Suffers the Most’: Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh’s 
Garment Factories (Apr. 2015), http://features.hrw.org/features/HRW_2015_reports 
/Bangladesh_Garment_Factories/assets/pdf/bangladesh0415_web.pdf (documenting continuing 
violations of garment workers’ rights in Bangladesh, details recent allegations of illegal anti-union tactics 
by managers, including assaults on union organizers, and shows the inadequacy of efforts to date to 
compensate victims of the Rana Plaza collapse and Tazreen Fashions fire).
205.  WAL-MART, RESPONSIBLE SOURCING IN BANGLADESH,
http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/ethical-sourcing/promoting-responsible-
sourcing-in-bangladesh (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  
206.  Id.
207.  Id. (“The Women in Factories Training Program is a five-year initiative by Walmart and 
the Walmart Foundation to work with NGOs in India, Bangladesh, China and Central America to 
provide critical life and work skills training to at least 60,000 women in the supply chain. The curriculum, 
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to the Institute for Sustainable Communities,208 and through the LEAN 
Manufacturing program.209 There is little mention made of any renewed or 
enhanced application of the human rights due diligence monitoring and remediation 
framework of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.210 The 
Women in Factories Training Program focuses on cultural and societal change 
through education, targeting changes in customs as a potential trigger to changes in 
law. “The program, which is being implemented in collaboration with local NGOs, 
will teach critical life skills related to communication, hygiene, reproductive health, 
occupational health and safety, identifying personal strengths and gender 
sensitivity.”211 The Institute for Sustainable Communities is also an intervention in 
the management of societal behavior norms and customs which was established as 
part of U.S. private efforts to help transitioning Eastern European states transition 
out of Soviet style systems and now works generally on transformative projects in 
places at a number of locations, including Bangladesh.212 Its Bangladesh operations, 
developed in partnership with CARE, provides women and men with the fundamental life and work 
skills necessary to be successful in the workplace, at home and in their communities.”). 
208.  Id. (“Walmart made a donation to the Institute of Sustainable Communities (ISC) to 
support the newly created Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Academy in Bangladesh. Through 
the EHS Academy, more apparel manufacturers in Bangladesh will have access to high-quality, 
affordable and comprehensive training on fire safety and environment, health and workplace safety.”). 
209.  Id. (“Our team at George, Asda’s and Walmart’s private-label clothing line, has worked 
with 17,000 workers in 34 factories in Bangladesh to implement the LEAN Manufacturing program. 
The LEAN program is designed to streamline production processes and invest in worker skills 
training.”). 
210.  Indeed, in 2013, Walmart sought to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy 
materials that asked the Walmart Board of Directors to report to shareholders on Walmart’s human 
rights risk assessment within it supply chains. The SEC agreed on the basis of its assessment that prior 
similar proposals had received very little support among shareholders. See SEC Div. Corp. Fin. To 
Erron W. Smith Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2013/marypattifftetal032713-14a8.pdf. However, Walmart has adopted a risk based approach to 
managing its supply chains. See Walmart, Managing Risk in Our Supply Chains, 
http://corporate.walmart.com/sourcing/managingrisk. Walmart has joined programs that are closely 
aligned to the U.N. Guiding Principles, for example the Fair Foods Program. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Joins 
McDonalds, Burger King, Subway, Chipotle, Whole Foods Market, & Trader Joe’s in Fair Food 
Program, http://www.andnowuknow.com/buyside-news/wal-mart-joins-mcdonalds-burger-king-
subway-chipotle-whole-foods-market-trader-joes-fai#.V1YHIo4wyi0. Walmart has been included in 
SHIFT’s UNGP Reporting Database. See http://www.ungpreporting.org/reportingdatabase 
/companies-page/. And it has cooperated though the methodologies of SHIFT’s RAFI reporting under 
the UNGP and Walmart’s governance methodologies appear to differ. See
http://www.shiftproject.org/project/human-rights-reporting-and-assurance-frameworks-initiative-
rafi.  
211.  WAL-MART, NEWS AND VIEWS, WALMART LAUNCHES GROUNDBREAKING INITIATIVE 
TO EMPOWER WOMEN WORKING IN FACTORIES IN INDIA, BANGLADESH, CHINA AND CENTRAL
AMERICA (Apr. 5, 2012), http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2012/04/05/walmart-launches-
groundbreaking-initiative-to-empower-women-working-in-factories-in-india-bangladesh-china-
central-america.  
212. THE INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, History, http://www.iscvt.org 
/impact/history (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  
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funded by USAID, the Swedish government, and Wal-Mart213 “supports the health 
and safety of women in factories. Trainings build the leadership and management 
skills needed to improve health and operational safety in the workplace.”214 It seeks 
to train factory managers on issues of gender disparities and essential health, 
environmental and safety methods.215 The LEAN program is part of a 
comprehensive technical assistance and process technology transfer program at 
Wal-Mart,216 in this case focused on its George brand.217
And indeed, by the second anniversary of the collapse of the Rana Plaza 
factory building, a number of the most active regulatory and governance 
stakeholders could look back on the collapse and its aftermath and reflect on the 
importance of their interventions. The government of Bangladesh spent substantial 
sums on the rescue and clean-up, though it is not clear how much of the funds 
expended were donated.218 Most recommitted themselves to a basic and noble 
objective—to ensure garment workers in Bangladesh a safe working environment. 
What that means for each turns on their role in apparel supply chains and the 
character of their institution and the methods through which they assert governance 
authority. For the Arrangement, the second anniversary meant coming closer to 
paying all claims.219 The Alliance noted its commitment to factory building 
inspection, remediation and its financing and safety training for workers.220 It also 
noted it willingness to “collaborate with all Stakeholders who are similarly 
committed to a safe and prosperous RMG sector.”221 They emphasized their role 
in working with the Bangladeshi state organs to “implement critical worker safety 
213.  THE INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, EHS+ CENTER-BANGLADESH,
http://www.iscvt.org/program/ehs-center-bangladesh/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  
214.  Id.
215. BANGLADESH EHS+ CENTER, FACT SHEET, http://www.iscvt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/EHS+-Network-Bangladesh-v2-8-14.pdf. (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
216.  See WAL-MART, EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN OUR SUPPLY CHAIN,
http://your.asda.com/system/dragonfly/production/2013/03/08/10_24_03_786_George_DTRT_
Report_2012_2013_SPREAD_.pdf. (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
217.  WAL-MART, GEORGE, DOING THE RIGHT THING UPDATE 2012-2013, pp. 6-11, 
http://your.asda.com/system/dragonfly/production/2013/03/08/10_24_03_786_George_DTRT_
Report_2012_2013_SPREAD_.pdf. (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).  
218.  A report noted: 
A rough estimate of the cost of the rescue operation was presented at a PMO press 
conference, indicating over Tk 46.66 million was spent. Of the amount, Dhaka district 
administration spent over Tk 25.38 million, army over Tk 12.13 million, other district 
administrations over Tk 3.51 million, Fire Service Tk 2.5 million and Dhaka police 
superintendent spent over Tk 2.7 million. Authorities spent Tk 395,000 to fence the site with 
tin. The injured were given 206 sarees, 111 three-piece and 158 lungis. The prime minister 
gave Tk 1.2 million to the rescuers as allowance and to buy tools for the rescue. 
Families of 104 Missing Rana Plaza Workers to Get Help, bdnews24.com, (Apr. 24, 2015), http:// 
bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/04/24/families-of-104-missing-rana-plaza-workers-to-get-help.  
219.  Id. (“‘A total of 2,871 victims applied for the help and 2,839 got aid after scrutiny,’ he said, 
quoting Bangladesh Labour Secretary Mikail Shipar.”).  
220.  Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Press Release: Statement on the Second Anniversary of the Rana 
Plaza Disaster (Apr. 2015), http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/files/press-releases/RANA 
%20ANNIVERSARY%20STATEMENT%202015.pdf.  
221.  Id.
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reforms and put systems in place that will be necessary to sustain those reforms.”222
The state party members of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact noted the 
progress that had been made in legislative changes within Bangladesh and the 
problems that remained for implementation.223 They noted particularly: 
the essential contributions of the ILO and development partners, including 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, Sweden, 
Norway and many others, as well as the European Commission and the 
US Government, who have through assistance programmes made a major 
contribution to creating awareness, developing strategies and action plans, 
training and capacity building with not only the competent authorities, but 
also workers and factory management.224
By April 2015, they reported the recognition of more than 300 garment 
industry trade unions, 2,500 safety inspections and the training of more than 250 
safety inspectors.225
But some of the language of the key European actors suggested a new twist 
on notions of sovereignty and the expression of democratic will. Federica 
Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, spoke about the need for European 
and international intervention in states that confront “severe political and social 
challenges, the Sustainability Compact has the potential for setting an example on 
how to address the basic needs and legitimate expectations of the people of 
Bangladesh. It is essential that this potential is brought to fruition.”226Cecilia 
Malmström, European Commissioner for Trade implied the connection between 
Bangladesh’s commitment toward reform of its labor laws and its continued access 
to the EU’s trade preferences under its “Everything-But-Arms initiative.”227
Marianne Thyssen, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and 
Labour Mobility was perhaps more blunt is describing the power relationships “all 
along our supply chains.”228 Those relationships, though cast in the language of 
partnership, also suggested its hierarchical ordering.229 Lastly, Neven Mimica, 
Commissioner in charge of International Cooperation and Development spoke to 
the internationalization of the frameworks within which Bangladesh might express 
222.  Id.
223.  BANGLADESH SUSTAINABILITY COMPACT: TECHNICAL STATUS REPORT, supra note 155, 
at 2. 
224.  Id.
225.  European Commission, Two years after Rana Plaza-progress report on Bangladesh Sustainability 
Compact (Apr. 24, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/rana-plaza-
progress-report_en.htm (since removed, original on file with author). It was not clear however, which 
safety standards were being referenced and whether the numbers included the efforts of the Alliance as 




229.  Id., (“In a globalised world, united efforts are needed and we will continue to promote 
better labour conditions in cooperation with our partners and in global fora such as the G7 and the 
G20.”). 
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its national preferences in law. It suggested as well the role of powerful developed 
states in the context of managing less powerful state behaviors, of a kind with their 
obligations to manage non-state actors.230
The European Parliament hosted an exhibition and conference for the 
purpose, in part, of emphasizing the need for “the fashion industry to take more 
responsibility for the safety and working conditions of those that supply them.”231
The European Parliament also put forward a resolution that appeared to assume as 
beyond dispute, the embedding of Bangladesh, its economic sectors, public and 
private global actors, and itself, within a network of regulatory structures whose 
application was necessary and perhaps mandatory.232
In the wake of the Rana Plaza collapse, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) also intervened. The OECD’s focus was 
on the development of due diligence guidelines for responsible supply chain in the 
garment and footwear sector,233 which it began to develop in December 2014.234 It 
is meant to serve as an influential source of soft law for garment production supply 
chains developed by the OECD states and their multistakeholder advisory groups. 
Thereafter national groups began to develop similar soft law approaches top 
sustainability in the garment and textile sector—to be formulated in the home states 
of apex supply chain corporations and imposed down the supply chain—in this case 
into Bangladesh.235 The World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on 
230.  Id. She noted: “Through our development support, the European Union fosters inclusive 
and sustainable growth that gives people access to jobs that fully respect existing international labour 
standards, ensure adequate working conditions and environmental protection. The Commission is also 
reflecting how we can create incentives for partner countries as well as the private sector for a 
responsible management of the supply chain in which all actors abide by those standards and 
principles.” Also posted at Neven Mimica, “A Day to Remember,” Blogpost 24 Apr. 2014, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/mimica/blog/day-remember_en.  
231.  Iwona Karbowska, European Parliament hosts an exhibition to mark the 2nd anniversary of the 
Rana Plaza factory collapse in Dhaka, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 24, 2015, http://www.independent.co 
.uk/news/pictures/european-parliament-hosts-an-exhibition-to-mark-the-2nd-anniversary-of-the-
rana-plaza-factory-collapse-in-dhaka-10201558.html.
232.  European Parliament resolution of 29 Apr. 2015 on the second anniversary of the Rana 
Plaza building collapse and progress of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact (2015/2589(RSP)), supra 
note 2. 
233.  See, e.g., OECD-ILO Roundtable on responsible supply chains in the textile and garment 
sector, (2014), Paris, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/2014-ilo-oecd-roundtable-textile-supply-
chains.htm; OECD Roundtable on Due Diligence in the Garment and Footwear Supply Chain, (2015), 
Paris, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/garment-footwear-supply-chain-due-diligence-roundtable-
2015.htm.  
234.  See OECD, Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector, 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/responsible-supply-chains-textile-garment-sector.htm.  
235.  See, e.g., Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER), Agreement on 
Sustainable Garment and Textile (presented Mar. 9, 2016) executed July 2016, 
http://www.oecdguidelines.nl/binaries/oecd-guidelines/documents/publication/2016/3/09 
/agreement-on-sustainable-garment-and-textile/160309-agreement-sustainable-garment-textile.pdf. 
Discussed in Press Release: Agreement on Sustainable Garment and Textile (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.euandgvc.nl/news/news/2016/03/10/agreement-on-sustainable-garment-and-textile. 
(“The next steps in this process will be to secure funding of the agreement and have it signed – in June 
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Human Rights also circulated a white paper framework for managing supply 
chains.236
Yet the focus on the garment sector also produced some controversy. In 2015, 
an influential business and human rights NGO lamented that laser focus on 
Bangladesh’s garment sector while “less attention has been paid to other industries 
such as leather, construction and cement: which do not have prominent links 
through to international supply chains.”237 They also noted that even with all the 
attention to the garment sector, local conditions below the bright gloss of 
governance and regulation reform remained difficult.238 The anniversary was 
marked by worker protests in Bangladesh,239 in part to put pressure on some 
companies sourcing garments in Bangladesh to make greater contributions to the 
Arrangement.240 The United States and the European Union issued a Joint 
Statement. It noted the successes and work ahead for reform of the regulatory space 
within with garment production occurs in Bangladesh.241 It also, perhaps more 
tellingly, declared their continued commitment to legislative reform in Bangladesh. 
This commitment was underlined by a European Parliament Resolution that sought 
to ensure that the European Union project its power to ensure substantial legislative 
reform in Bangladesh, the institutionalization of corporate responsibility down 
supply chains, and the reform of cultures of corruption.242 The criminal cases 
– by at least 35 companies in the sector, who together represent at least 30 percent of sales in the 
Netherlands.”)
236.  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: A
NEW PARADIGM FOR SUPPLY CHAINS (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC 
_Supply_Chains_%20A_New_Paradigm_2015.pdf.  
237.  Harpreet Kaur, No way to mark the 2nd anniversary of the Rana Plaza building collapse in 
Bangladesh, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Apr. 22, 2015, http://business-humanrights.org
/en/no-way-to-mark-the-2nd-anniversary-of-the-rana-plaza-building-collapse-in-bangladesh.  
238.  Id., citing the report of another NGO, The Lost Thread – Violations and abuse of power in the 
garment industry in Bangladesh.
239.  See, e.g., Bangladesh: Rana Plaza Victims’ Orphans Stage Sit-In On 2nd Anniversary of Collapse,
International Union League for Brand Responsibility, Apr. 24, 2015, http://www.union-
league.org/rana_plaza_orphans_bangladesh.  
240.  Id. This echoed similar calls from other NGOs. See Global Unions Say to Benetton ‘Pagare’/Pay 
Up!, INDUSTRIALL, Feb. 19, 2015, http://www.industriall-union.org/global-unions-say-to-benetton-
pagare-pay-up. The European Parliament also joined in this effort. See European Parliament resolution 
on the second anniversary of the Rana Plaza building collapse and progress of the Bangladesh 
Sustainability Compact (Apr. 29, 2015) (2015/2589(RSP)) at ¶2, http://www 
.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P8-RC-2015-
0363+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
241.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release, Joint Statement on the 
Second Anniversary of the Rana Plaza Disaster in Bangladesh, supra note 1. (“Our commitment to 
Bangladesh is strong and enduring. The European Union and the United States, in close cooperation 
with the ILO, will remain closely engaged with the Government of Bangladesh in the spirit of 
partnership to continue our work together to ensure that economic growth and sustainable 
development go hand-in-hand with workers’ safety and rights.”). 
242.  See European Parliament resolution on the second anniversary of the Rana Plaza building 
collapse and progress of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact (Apr. 29, 2015)(2015/2589(RSP)) at 
¶1-27, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP 
//TEXT+MOTION+P8-RC-2015-0363+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
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against Mr. Rana and others drags on.243 It was only in 2015 that forty-one people, 
including Mr. Rana, his parents, the factory owners, more than a dozen government 
officials, and others, were charged with murder in the deaths that resulted from the 
building collapse.244 The civil actions alleging violation of safety rules are also 
pending.245 All the pieces of this regulatory puzzle appear both in place and in play. 
Yet, even by the second anniversary of the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory 
building, another image appeared much more clearly. With a closer look, one might 
discern the outlines of the construction of another Rana Plaza factory building, not 
a physical manifestation producing garments, but a factory building designed to 
create a space for the production of regulation/governance by a variety of producers 
to satisfy the domestic and global needs of markets in regulation/governance. This 
new regulatory factory in many ways resembled the Rana Plaza factory building 
itself. The building has developed in part through coordinated planning and in part 
organically, adding structured and unstructured layers of work spaces for 
governance producers to operate. Its regulatory factory space was constructed in 
several layers, only some of which might be understood as registered with 
legitimating authorities. Indeed, it is not clear that, except perhaps at a very great 
level of generality there is a single point source of authentication, and in any case it 
is relatively hard to find some agent for enough authentication to get by. It was 
subdivided into a number of operational “factories” operated locally but driven by 
absent and very powerful institutional actors. They competed with each other both 
for adherents (workers) and for clients, sourcing regulatory commodities for both 
domestic and global consumption. And they produce a variety of products, each 
factory within the regulatory factory building manufactures products for a number 
of brands. From a distance the factory appears tidy and coordinated—all of these 
regulatory endeavors are housed within a building complex that is singular and 
appears unified. The regulatory factory building looks solid enough, but inside 
complexity and conflict are as common as harmonization and coordination among 
the occupants of the factory building. And each of the factory owners continues to 
make changes that may affect the structure of the building in which all are housed. 
Is the Rana Plaza regulatory/governance factory also structurally compromised and 
ready to collapse? Is there a factory building? It is to the elaboration of a theory of 
regulatory action from the story of the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building 
that the next section turns. 
243.  Bangladesh mourns anniversary of garment factory disaster, DAILY HERALD (AP), Apr. 24, 2015, 
http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20150424/business/304249940.  
244.  Rana Plaza collapse: dozens charged with murder, THE GUARDIAN, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/rana-plaza-collapse-dozens-charged-with-murder-
bangladesh. (“Investigators said the shift from the culpable homicide charges came after the 
investigation found that Rana, his staff and the management of the five factories had forced the workers 
to enter the building despite their unwillingness to work on the day of the accident after the building 
developed major cracks a day earlier.”). See supra notes 78-79. 
245.  Id.
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III. DRAWING THEORY FROM CONTEXT: TRANSNATIONAL, POLYCENTRIC OR 
OTHER LEGAL ORDER?
The Rana Plaza building collapse provides both a germinal illustration and a 
structure for approaching the issue of theorizing the complex interactions of 
governance institutions. The building collapse and its aftermath are neither random 
nor disconnected. They suggest the outlines of an emerging ordering of governance 
that is situated within, between and beyond states, but that is felt like law but may 
not be tied to the domestic orders of states. Indeed, the Rana Plaza building collapse 
appears to call out for a theory to craft a normative theory within which the “story” 
of Rana Plaza can be understood, framed and contained within a rational structure 
of law, politics and economics. In the face of the tragedy that is the Rana Plaza 
building collapse, and perhaps the greater tragedy of the actions that followed in the 
political, economic and societal spheres, such theorizing is necessary to rationally 
order the past and manage the future. 
Theory provides an instrument to manage policy discourse and the 
development and application of the techniques of governance that may be deployed 
in the service of the premises at the core of the policies structured within theoretical 
constructs. In the case of Rana Plaza, commentators derived a number of theories 
and approaches that appeared to conform their own views of the nature of 
governance and the operation of the emerging economic global order. One 
perspective embedded Rana Plaza within the larger project of folding transnational 
economic activity, and the enterprises through which these activities are undertaken, 
within systems of international legalities.246 Another perspective seen in Rana Plaza 
and its aftermath the emerging hierarchy of the management of developing (host) 
states by developed states and their multinational enterprises.247 Still another seen 
in Rana Plaza, are the possibilities for reforms of Bangladesh labor or other laws to 
approach or conform to international standards,248 or those of other states.249 This 
perspective is sometimes contextualized within private governance and focused on 
the structures for managing downstream suppliers,250 or the effectiveness of 
246.  See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Empire, Global Enterprise, And Global Justice, 10 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 917, 953-54 (2013). 
247.  See Peter C. Hansen, Avoiding Harmful Overreach When Promoting Human Rights In African 
Investments, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1113 (2014).  
248.  See Tamanna Rubya, Note: The Ready-Made Garment Industry: An Analysis Of Bangladesh’s 
Labor Law Provisions After The Savar Tragedy, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2015). 
249.  S.M. Solaiman, Unprecedented Factory Fire Of Tazreen Fashions In Bangladesh: Revisiting 
Bangladeshi Labor Laws In Light Of Their Equivalents In Australia, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125 (2013); 
Alyssa B. Coffey, Note: Beyond Pre-Reconstruction Slavery: America’s Modern Day Trade Practices And 
Confronting Forced Labor, 6 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 201, 208-09 (2015). 
250.  See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 747 (2014) 
(approach grounded in reflexive law principles). This perspective is quite useful for its insights on the 
fragmentation and diffusion of intersect and incentive within a multilayered public and private 
governance order that easily evades traditional legal structures of command. It seeks to devise 
techniques that match the behavior structures of critical actors within the context of the problem to be 
corrected.
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corporate codes of conduct in global management of behavior in economic 
relationships across a supply or production chain251 (and their legalization),252 or 
ethical sourcing.253 A related perspective contextualizes Rana Plaza within the larger 
issue of supply chain behaviors, emerging business expectations and the distribution 
of societal, economic and legal risk for damages.254 These can focus on the 
importance of one or another of the actions taken in the wake of the Rana Plaza 
building collapse—the Accord, for example, as a new type of governance contract 
that ought to function more like law than a private arrangement among the parties 
thereto.255 Conversely, still another perspective of Rana Plaza sees in supply chains 
a means of closing a governance gap that limits the ability of states to manage their 
own internal orders and that requires a sharing of governance responsibilities across 
a group of stakeholders.256 Rana Plaza is sometimes embedded in other global 
movements—gender based empowerment,257 human rights to health,258 embedding 
rights to development within legal regimes,259 or greater public and private 
monitoring and accountability structuring.260
251.  See Barbara J. Fick, Corporate Social Responsibility For Enforcement Of Labor Rights: Are There 
More Effective Alternatives?, 4 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 31 (2014); Greg M Zipes, Ties That Bind: Codes Of 
Conduct That Require Automatic Reductions To The Pay Of Directors, Officers, And Their Advisors For Failures Of 
Corporate Governance, 15 J. Bus. & Sec. L. 105, 122-23 (2014); Sarah Labowitz & Dorothée Baumann-
Pauly, NYU Stern Sch. of Bus., Business As Usual Is Not an Option: Supply Chains and Sourcing after Rana 
Plaza (2014), https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con 
_047408.pdf; Donald C. Dowling Jr., Global Codes of Conduct, 24 No. 3 Int’l HR J. ART 1 (2015). 
252.  See, e.g., Madeleine Conway, A New Duty of Care? Tort Liability from Voluntary Human Rights 
Due Diligence in Global Supply Chains, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 741, 753 (2015) (Canada). 
253.  See Olivera Medenica, The Importance Of Counsel In The Context Of The Fashion Industry’s 
Emerging Issues, Aspatore (Sept. 1, 2014) 2014 WL 5473989) at 6.  
254.  E. Christopher Johnson Jr., Business Lawyers Are In A Unique Position To Help Their Clients 
Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor Trafficking And Child Labor, 70 Bus. Law. 1083, 1101-02 (2015). 
See also Elizabeth Tuttle, Note: Made In Violation: Non-Legal Solutions To Labor Abuses Perpetrated By 
American Multinational Corporations In Foreign Sweatshops, 17 Duq. Bus. L.J. 101 (2015) (arguing for the use 
of non-legal solutions, focused on corporate codes of conduct and consumer involvement, to meet this 
this global issue). 
255.  See, e.g., Mark Anner, Jennifer Baird, and Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability In Global Supply 
Chains: Addressing The Root Causes Of Labor Violations In International Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J 1 (2013).  
256.  See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL, SHARED 
RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR SUPPLY CHAINS (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs 
/WEF_GAC_Supply_Chains_%20A_New_Paradigm_2015.pdf. 
257.  See, e.g., Lamia Karim, Analyzing Women’s Empowerment: Microfinance And Garment Labor In 
Bangladesh, 38-SUM Fletcher F. World Aff. 153 (2014). 
258.  See Carol Castleberry, A Human Right To Health: Is There One And, If So, What Does It Mean?,
10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 220-221 (2015). 
259.  See Upendra Acharya, The Future Of Human Development: The Right To Survive As A 
Fundamental Element Of The Right To Development 42 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 345, 364 (2014) 
(“Corporate activity in underdeveloped areas of the world additionally lead to continued 
underdevelopment. Perhaps one of the most current examples is that of the garment belt in Bangladesh, 
where disregard for the basic safety of factory workers has cost thousands of lives in factory fires and 
collapses.”). 
260.  See Natasha Schwarzbach and Ben Richardson, A Bitter Harvest: Child Labour In Sugarcane 
Agriculture And The Role Of Certification Systems, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 99, 126-27 (2014). 
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However, few consider the possibility of systemicity in the complex of 
relationships that constitute the Rana Plaza episode in spatial and temporal 
context.261 Indeed, there is much to learn from the bits and pieces that make up 
what is organized here as the construct of the governance regimes of Rana Plaza 
from before, through, and after the collapse of the factory building and among 
public and private actors within and beyond Bangladesh. But it is also possible that 
from these bits and pieces, might emerge the outlines of a system, of something 
new, that is coherent and self-referencing. It is possible to posit order within the 
multiple actors, jurisdictions and intermeshing governance orders that constitute 
that regulatory stew that is Rana Plaza. Yet if Rana Plaza illustrates the operation of 
such a system, then what kind of system is it? Three possibilities are considered. 
A. A Transnational Legal Order? 
Transnational Legal Orders (TLOs) are constellations of legal norms, 
organizations, and actors that seek to order behavior in a highly globalized world in 
ways that transcend nation-states.262 The concept was developed with contributions 
from a variety of scholars representing multiple disciplines, including: international 
lawyers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and law and language 
experts.263 TLOs contain three elements: order, legal, and transnational?that is they 
must exhibit the characteristics of a governance order that is at once both legal in 
character and transnational in scope.264 First, a TLO must solve or order some 
problem recognized by actors. That is, a TLO seeks to theorize the basic issue of 
what is ordered and the behaviors entailed in the notion of order.265 Second, TLOs 
are legalized and legitimized because they employ legal norms.266 That is, TLO 
theory seeks to understand the distinctiveness of a legal order.267 Finally, TLOs are 
261.  On the importance of both temporal and spatial dimensions in complex multi-planed 
governance, see, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Governance Polycentrism Or Regulated Self-Regulation—Rule Systems for 
Human Rights Impacts of Economic Activity Where National, Private and International Regimes Collide,
CONTESTED COLLISIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES INTO NORM FRAGMENTATION IN 
WORLD SOCIETY 198 (eds., Kerstin Blome, Hannah Franzki, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Nora Markard 
and Stefan Oeter, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016). 
262. Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, 3, 5-6 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2015). 
263.  Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, acknowledgements in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS, xi, xi-xii (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2015). 
264.  Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 475, 475-76 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New 
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
265.  Halliday and Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 263, at 5-9 (“An ‘order,’ in other 
words, connotes some regularity of behavioral orientation, communication and action, but it remains 
open to incremental change and considerable variation.” Id. at 9.). 
266.  Halliday and Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 265, at 475-76. 
267.  Halliday and Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 263, at 9-18 (stipulating three 
distinct attributes: norms produced by or in conjunction with a legal organization or network (ibid., 11); 
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transnational as they exist in a globalized society, and are not attached or bound to 
one nation-state.268 That is, TLO theory seeks to contextualize legal ordering within 
the transnational sphere. 
TLOs have certain characteristics that are certainly not uniform among the 
many TLOs that exist today. For example, TLOs come in different sizes and apply 
to different legal areas.269 They do not exist for an indefinite amount of time, they 
may rise and fall quickly or exist for a long period of time.270 TLOs apply to different 
areas and are not bound to any one state, they are implemented differently across 
nations.271 Finally, TLOs are not bound to a uniform standard and they may exist 
in different sizes and structures.272 The task of the TLO project is to “produce a 
theoretically infused and empirically based approach to mapping and explaining the 
formation, institutionalization and impact of TLOs.”273
The concept of the TLO, as applied by scholars from across many different 
disciplines, builds from Terrence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer’s influential work 
on TLOs.274 In their book, Halliday and Shaffer seek to build theories and empirical 
understanding of TLOs for the purposes described above.275 Scholars have applied 
their concept of TLOs to empirically study different regulatory areas that help flesh 
out both the concept of the TLO and its position with global ordering. 
For example, Susan Block-Lieb and Terrence Halliday examined TLOs in 
bankruptcy and maritime law.276 The focus is on the development of a “conceptual 
basis for establishing when the legal norms promulgated by a TLO have settled.”277
Roderick Macdonald traces the emergence of TLOs that govern secured transaction 
law.278 He finds that there is not a proposal for a comprehensive and global uniform 
the norms engage legal institutions within multiple nation-states (ibid., 13); and the norms are produced 
in recognizable legal forms ((ibid., 15)). 
268.  Id., at 18-20 (“TLOs span legal orders that vary in their geographic scope, from bilateral 
to plurilateral agreements, to private transnational codes to regional governance bodies to global 
regulatory ordering.”); see also Halliday and Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 265, 
at 476. 
269.  Halliday and Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 265, at 516-17. 
270.  Id., at 517. 
271.  Id.
272.  Id., at 518. 
273. Halliday and Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, supra note 263, at 21. 
274. Nicely collected in the essays published in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, (eds., 
Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
275. See generally Halliday and Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS, 5 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 
supra note 263. 
276.  Susan Block-Lieb and Terrence Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global 
Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 75-113 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory 
Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015).  
277.  Id. at 109. The timing and location of this settling has powerful effects on textual meaning. 
Ibid. Meaning, itself, then, develops in a transnational and recursive context that is amplified by the 
multiple sites within which these norms are made and then come to be legalized. 
278.  Roderick Macdonald, When Lenders Have Too Much Cash and Borrowers Have Too Little Law: 
The Emergence of Secured Transactions Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 114-
53 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
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and codified secured transaction TLO.279 Rather, there may be informal and 
uncodified TLOs.280 These TLOs are emerging due to the spread of Lex Americana
by the US through three mechanisms: US influence on the work of international 
lawmaking agencies, influence of international financial agencies, and financing of 
some graduate programs in law and economics.281
Philip Genschel and Thomas Rixen analyze the TLO on double tax relief and 
analyze its impact on taxpayers.282 They offer four empirical lessons.283 First, tax 
TLOs were facilitated by the narrowness of their scope.284 Second, consolidation of 
Tax TLOs was possible because it was undertaken at a time when its “practical 
significance and political salience were rather limited.”285 Third, the tax TLOs 
impact tends toward issue expansion, overlap and enmeshment; they may start small 
but grow.286 According to Genschel and Rixen, TLOs have an innate tendency that 
leads to “issue expansion, overlap, and enmeshment.”287 Fourth, timing and 
sequence matter in TLO development.288 They conclude that because a TLO 
initially “deals only with one particular issue or set of issues in isolation, it is likely 
to create unintended ([sometimes unforeseen]) spillover effects on other issues: By 
ordering – solving – one particular problem, they reshape the problem context and 
may thus trigger a further round of legal ordering.”289 They further conclude that 
TLOs “shape social relations and outcomes both by constraining and by enabling 
behavior.”290
In the context of the TLOs for monetary law and trade law, Gregory Shaffer 
and Michael Waibel address variation in the alignment (and misalignment) between 
trade and monetary TLOs regarding three particular issues: balance of payments, 
currency manipulation, and capital controls. They examine how variation in how 
the rules of these two TLOs align affects outcomes. For example, they argue that 
these TLOs have become “less aligned over the use of capital controls since the 
1990s.”291 According to Shaffer and Waibel, the alignment on this issue in “legal 
ordering becomes more difficult, despite the considerable legalization and 
judicialization of one of the two TLOs?the trade one.”292 Eric Helleiner 
279.  Id. at 146.  
280.  Id. (“Such a comprehensive, global, and systematic TLO may be emerging, albeit as an 
informal, not a codified, legal order.” Id. ) 
281.  Id. at 147-48.
282.  Philip Genschel and Thomas Rixen, Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of 
International Taxation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 154-83 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory 
Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
283.  Id. at 178-81. 
284.  Id. at 178-79. 
285.  Id.
286.  Id. at 179 
287.  Id.
288.  Id. at 179-80. 
289.  Id. at 178. 
290.  Id. at 179. 
291.  Id. at 225. 
292.  Id.
2016] Are Supply Chains Transnational Legal Orders? 51 
complements this analysis in the context of the ineffectiveness of the transnational 
financial legal order.293 He traces the incremental and piecemeal development of 
this TLO in response to crises in globalizing financial markets, but finds the 
financial TLO not highly institutionalized.294 As a result, he contends that the 
“ineffectiveness is more likely to prompt policymakers to increasingly embrace a 
more decentralized order involving the greater use of host country regulation and 
even restrictions on cross-border movements of financial capital.”295
In analyzing the TLO for food safety, Tim Büthe considers the Codex 
Alimentarus and its alignment with the World Trade Organization which has helped 
to produce TLO institutionalization.296 He maintains that the focus on 
institutionalization “should therefore lead to an intensification of the conflicts of 
interest during the rulemaking within the institutionalized TLO.”297 He finds that 
this TLO “consists not of a static bundle of rules but of a combination of specific 
current rules and meta-rules and procedures for updating or appending the current 
rules. These characteristics are found in other areas of global governance as well.”298
TLOs do not so much “solve” governance issues as they reshape the context in 
which these challenges are approached. Thus, regarding the climate change TLO, 
Daniel Bodansky notes only limited normative settling. 299 He concludes that even 
if micro-TLOs for climate change in particular sub-issues have emerged, “it may 
not be sufficient to solve climate change problems.”300
Laurence Helfer “applies the TLO framework to explain the origins of … 
controversies and their consequences” in the area of access to medicines.301 He 
provides a “conclusion that future studies of TLOs may wish to explore: that highly 
contested international rules constrain, rather than expand, the policy space 
available to governments when those rules are transposed into national and sub 
293.  Eric Helleiner, Regulating the Regulators: The Emergence and Limits of the Transnational Financial 
Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 231-57 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, 
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
294.  Id. at 232 (one that might lead to a legitimacy crisis). 
295.  Id. at 255.  
296.  Tim Büthe, Institutionalization and its Consequences: The TLO(s) for Food Safety, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 258-86, (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015) (“Institutionalization in this sense is important because the analytical 
usefulness of recognizing TLOs as a distinct phenomenon hinges on them being more than a reflection 
of the momentary inter- or transnational distribution of powers.” Id. at 260). 
297.  Id. at 261. 
298.  Id.
299.  Chapter 8: Daniel Bodansky, Climate Change: Transnational Legal Order or Disorder?, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 287 (eds., Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
300.  Id. at 305. (“To the extent that order has emerged, it has been through a more bottom-up 
process.” Id. at 304). 
301.  Laurence Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution 
of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 311-39 (eds., 
Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015); see also Gregory 
Shaffer & Susan K. Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access to Medicines, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE, 97, 98 (eds., Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley, Oxford Univ. Press, 2014). 
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national legal systems and can be invoked and enforced by competing groups of 
domestic actors.”302 This insight reinforces the notion of interplay of politics and 
institutionalization in TLOs operating at multiple governance levels.303
Does Rana Plaza fit comfortably within TLO theory? TLO theory offers two 
potentially useful approaches to the analysis of the context that is Rana Plaza—the 
aggregate of operations that are embedded in a supply chain. The first considers the 
premise that the supply chain is an object of transnational governance effectuated 
through networks of transnational legal orders. It is premised on the idea that TLO 
theory is a useful means of approaching the interactions of these multiple legal 
ordering initiatives as they affect particular points in the supply chain. The second 
considers the premise that the supply chain (or a supply chain in a particular area, 
such as for apparel) itself is an integrated and self-referencing transnational legal 
order. It is grounded in the notion that the supply chain itself is the framework 
within which a unified transnational legal order operates. Each is considered in turn. 
One can make a strong case that a close reading of the governance structures 
around the Rana Plaza building collapse suggest the emergence of a well-defined 
TLO. Reading Rana Plaza within its multiple contexts—within Bangladesh, within 
global supply chains, and in time—points to an order that is both legal and 
transnational in the way that the advocates of TLO theory would embrace. If that 
is indeed the case, the Rana Plaza serves as a powerful additional evidence of the 
power and value of TLO theory to explain and understand emerging governance 
frameworks.
1. Supply Chains as Nexus Points for TLO Systems 
One can see in Rana Plaza the existence and interactions of related TLOs. 
And, indeed, Rana Plaza might provide a valuable case study not merely for the 
structuring of TLOs but for a theory of their interactions around particular events 
that touch on their respective governance zones. Every one of the actors that 
affected or were affected by these events could be understood as an autonomous 
TLO, or as constituents of a broader TLO comprising states, multinational 
enterprises, civil society, and international organizations. 
a. States 
 To a great extent, states appear to embody what TLOs are not—national legal 
orders embedded in an international order of states. Yet consider the nature of that 
embedding of states within the emerging international framework of governance. 
The state players in Rana Plaza provide a good example. Each is to a greater or 
lesser extent a national legal order, but Bangladesh appears to test the conception 
of states as distinct legal orders whose borders form a permeable barrier within 
which legitimate legal ordering, grounded in democratic and representational 
302.  Id. at 335. 
303.  Id. at 376. 
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principles, can be maintained. Both before and after the factory building collapse. 
Bangladesh itself appears to be a state only with respect to residual characteristics 
of statehood. It operates as a state in form, but in effect, it appears more as a container 
for the implementation of the governance orders of other actors than as the 
controlling organization of its own distinctive legal order.304 TLO theory can help 
us understand the changing character of developing states emerging within the 
globalized legal order as internally constituted parts of broader TLOs. Bangladesh 
appears to be a receptacle within which the functionally differentiated governance 
orders developed by multinational enterprises and international organizations 
reside, and in residing contribute to the articulation of a transnational order within 
the national territory.305 That transformation of the Bangladeshi national legal order
reflects transnational legal ordering.
It follows that Bangladesh can be understood as a site of incomplete 
governance that requires a network of transnational actors to complete.306 This 
transformation becomes evident in the context of Bangladesh’s positioning in its 
international relations. Before the building collapse, Bangladesh’s domestic legal 
order could be understood as a particularized expression of a transnational legal 
order—the aggregation of Bangladesh’s obligations under its international treaties, 
and especially its trade and investment treaties with other states and international 
organizations. The resulting partial internationalization of Bangladesh law—at least 
with respect to those internal elements of Bangladesh activities covered by those 
engagements—might indicate a loss of sovereignty in classical terms. But it may also 
evidence the embedding of Bangladesh within a legal order that is transnational. 
That legal order was manifested effectively in the wake of the building collapse. The 
swift move by the U.S. and the European Union to advance agreements with 
Bangladesh covering a variety of changes to Bangladesh’s domestic legal order 
through applying international norms suggests the way that states themselves should 
be understood as participants in TLOs, especially relating to that portion of national 
regulation that relates to transnational activity. 
304.  See Ralf Michaels’s excellent discussion of states as sites for TLO in State Law as a 
Transnational Legal Order, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 141-160 (2016).  
305.  Larry Catá Backer, Fractured Territories and Abstracted Terrains: Human Rights Governance 
Regimes Within and Beyond the State, 23 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing in the 
context of the loss of representational legitimacy). 
306.  As Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly note in their study:  
Filling the governance gap will require a network of interconnected actors – national and 
international companies, governments, civil society, unions, and international organizations 
– to enhance governance in the garment sector through a mix of public and private 
mechanisms is means fostering greater transparency in business relationships, investing in 
enhanced regulatory oversight, coordinating financing systems for making factories safer, 
and prioritizing infrastructure development. 
SARAH LABOWITZ AND DOROTHÉE BAUMANN-PAULY, BUSINESS AS USUAL IS NOT AND OPTION:
SUPPLY CHAINS AND SOURCING AFTER RANA PLAZA 46 (NYU Stern Center for Business and Human 
Rights, 2014). 
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b. Multinational organizations 
 Multinational enterprises are usually viewed as the classical expression of 
transnational order. In the Rana Plaza events, they clearly evidence their character 
as transnational and as an ordering system. Multinational enterprises were a crucial 
player in governance orders within Bangladesh through their supplier codes of 
conduct and the governance power they asserted down their supply chains. But that 
governance order was quite narrow—focused on the characteristics and behaviors 
of downstream supply chain partners, and sometimes in competition with the 
governance orders of competitor multinational enterprises. Enterprises have been 
quite aggressive in resisting notions that their obligations under their own normative 
systems extend beyond their suppliers to so called third party beneficiaries.307 That 
severely limits the scope and effectiveness of the governance community created, 
and may make it harder to consider the outcomes to constitute either law or order. 
The answer depends, in part, on what one considers to be a legal order, as Rana 
Plaza highlights both the legal and non-legal ordering around which transnational 
economic actors organize their activities. MNE self-constituting governance orders 
can be understood both as legal308 and governance309 orders. It depends on the 
concepts of the observer and the way one characterizes their connection with the 
domestic legal orders of the states in which they operate. What appears clear from 
the realities of Bangladesh before the building collapse was that the supply chains 
were ordered as transnational systems, but their legal character was, at best indirect 
and consequential. They might have impacted the legal order of Bangladesh, and 
they might have been protected within the domestic legal orders of home and host 
states, but they were not directly legal because their existence depended on their 
autonomy from law. 
Yet even in the context of the transnational orders of economic actors, it is 
possible to see the emergence of a legal order in the aftermath of the building 
collapse. It is in the collective action of economic enterprises—in the Accord and 
Alliance—that one sees the emergence of private transnational governance orders 
that begin to take on a set of legal characteristics. The Accord and Alliance represent 
the self-constitution of private and public governance orders to the ends of 
developing and implementing legal regimes within a state that incorporates and 
legalizes international normative rules. It is not just that the Accord and Alliance are 
legal persons, but that their object is the construction of a legal order that is 
inherently transnational. The move towards this form of transnationalism—
involving states, international organizations, and private actors—points to the rise 
of a new normal for legal ordering both within and beyond the state. The same, of 
course, is true of the Arrangement. On the one hand, it can be viewed as a means 
307.  See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F. 3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009). 
308.  GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING 
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (Oxford 2010). 
309. GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND GLOBALIZATION (Gareth Norbury Trans., 2012). 
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for avoiding domestic litigation. Yet the Arrangement itself is grounded in legalities 
that are internationalized and embedded within legal systems itself. Both in its 
administration and in its normative structure it evidences a distinctive and 
autonomous order that is functionally differentiated in a narrow way but, within the 
scope of its function, legal and transnational. 
c. Civil society and international organizations 
Civil society played a crucial but derivative role both before and after the 
building collapse. To a large extent Rana Plaza suggests the necessary role of civil 
society in the development of TLOs that may be centered in the state, in 
multinational enterprises, or in multilateral orders. Civil society serves as a driver of 
accountability both as a supplement and a substitute for the monitoring and 
accountability functions of the state, the multinational enterprise and multilateral 
(international) orders. But civil society may not drive TLOs. And it is not clear from 
Rana Plaza, either before or in the aftermath of the building collapse, that civil 
society itself, and for itself, constitutes a free-standing TLO. On the other hand, 
one might see in civil society the necessary elements of functionally differentiated 
self-constituted orders that are transnational. But might they be legal orders? It is 
true enough that these orders may lead toward legalization, broadly understood. But 
it is less clear that their ordering is itself, while transnational, either legal or 
ordered.310
International organizations are deeply embedded in state-based and enterprise 
TLOs. Rana Plaza clearly shows that the international or transnational portion of a 
TLO is grounded on the core work of international organizations as norm 
producers and as the focus of the structures within which internationalization 
occurs.311 Indeed, Rana Plaza suggests that international organizations are a crucial 
element in the establishment and structuring of TLOs. They provide normative 
values, the principles that might find expression through law (and governance), and 
also serve as the “order” through which transnational legalization may be 
implemented. But those normative values are sometimes understood as aspirational, 
or the sources from which specific regulatory governance (public and private) may 
be based. Thus, for example, the U.N. Guiding Principles are invoked as a baseline 
standard, but often for judging the effectiveness of private ordering.312 The 
310.  Consider in this respect the recent trends toward the control of foreign NGOs by many 
states. These might evidence either the legalization or the absence of transnational NGOs. See, e.g., Larry 
Catá Backer, Managing Civil Society—Next Generation NGO Laws and Resistance to the Internationalization of 
Civil Society and its Normative Elements, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/managing-civil-society-next-generation.html; Office of 
the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Civil Society Space And The United Nations Human Rights System
(Oct. 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/CivilSociety/CS_space_ 
UNHRSystem_Guide.pdf. 
311.  Catá Backer, supra note 310. 
312.  “The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights appear to have 
been ignored in Bangladesh.” Business and Human Rights Resource Center, The Rana Plaza building 
collapse in Bangladesh - one year on (Apr. 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/en/the-rana-plaza-
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embedding of international normative standards is sometimes undertaken through 
civil society capacity building, which includes strong elements of transnational 
socialization through legal norms.313 In the European Union context, they may also 
serve as an aspirational governance template within European legal orders.314
It is curious to note the way that ILO principles found expression in the terms 
of legalization and in the structure of the orders. The Accord, the Arrangement, and 
the multi-state compacts seem to center the ILO within their governance 
frameworks. The ILO appears to serve both as a means of seeking legitimacy for 
the normative foundations of private multinational enterprise self-ordering, and it 
also served as the source of those very normative framework for the transnational 
legal ordering of those enterprises. That is, its institutional participation was as 
necessary as the application of its normative framework. Both together appeared to 
provide the imprimatur necessary to legitimate the public character of the actions 
of these private actors. The harder question centers on the extent to which 
international organizations themselves are integral to the creation of TLOs. On the 
one hand, it is easy to dismiss international organizations as appendages but never 
as the central catalyst of a TLO. And there is much evidence in Rana Plaza to suggest 
that this is the primary role of international organizations. Yet, on the other hand, 
such a view ignores the very real autonomy of international organizations as legal 
orders in their own right that themselves are enmeshed in ordering relationships 
among networks of actors.315 Within the context of Rana Plaza, it may be possible 
to characterize the ILO as a core agent within the broader TLO, or within an array 
of competing TLOs, for the governance of apparel supply chains. 
building-collapse-in-bangladesh-one-year-on. Both enterprises and states were criticized for the failure 
to embed the duties and responsibilities of the UN Guiding Principles in their response to the Rana 
Plaza Building collapse. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Press Release: “The 
lessons of Rana Plaza have still not been learned” – UN expert group on business and human rights 
(May 15, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID 
=15965&LangID=E#sthash.dRwT5V5G.dpuf. 
313.  Thus for example, consider the Pillars in Practice Program, undertaken by the NGO Social 
Accountability International, in partnership with the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the object of 
which is to advance the UN Guiding Principles in Bangladesh, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. See Social 
Accountability International, Pillars in Practice Program, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=1344. SIA has noted that “Bangladesh is a key 
focus country in our Pillars in Practice Program (PIP), in partnership with the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights (DiHR) and the CSR Centre Bangladesh. PIP builds the capacity of local civil society 
organizations to engage with and train on the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.” 
Social Accountability International, Bangladesh - 1 Year after Rana Plaza Collapse (Apr. 2014), 
http://sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=1585.  
314.  See Jerome Chaplier and Paige Morrow, Three Years After Rana Plaza: Progress on Corporate 
Responsibility Remains Modest, EURACTIV.COM, Apr. 28, 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/section/social 
-europe-jobs/opinion/three-years-after-rana-plaza-progress-on-corporate-responsibility-remains-
modest/ (Companies “need to see the EU engage constructively in the implementation of its 
international commitments, particularly the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Rules to set up level playing field for human rights due diligence by companies in the European market 
would be an essential first step towards making responsible business conduct the norm and not the 
exception.”).
315.  Shaffer et al., supra note 7. 
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d. Supply Chains as TLOs 
There is much to be said for the argument that Rana Plaza provides a 
contextually and temporally based illustration of a number of TLOs whose impact 
on the events—both those leading to the collapse, and in response to that 
collapse—was decisive, as I will consider the possibility of disordered order, that is 
of order without a center as an alternative perspective. If TLO theory is useful for 
understanding the segmented TLO systems at play during the arc of the events 
around the Rana Plaza building collapse, do the interactions of these segmented 
TLOs imply systemicity within the arc? That is, assuming the transnational and legal 
elements of the governance actions around the Rana Plaza factory collapse, does 
Rana Plaza also suggest that, in the aggregate, it evidences a singular order organized 
around a supply chain? 
One way to approach the answer is in the affirmative. After all, the end 
product of the factory building collapse was the movement of a number of TLOs 
in union or cooperation to elaborate a new legal structure for the management of 
factory production within global supply chains. Better said, perhaps, the Rana Plaza 
building collapse itself merely served as one of those rare moments when the 
coherent governance substructures that define the supply chain as an autonomous 
legal order were exposed, if only briefly. But that moment of exposure produced a 
substantial amount of effort at shifting the focus of regulation from the actors in 
supply chains to the supply chain itself as the site that itself sustains its own 
transnational legal order. Shifting the focus of regulation to the supply chain has 
been the object of the production of both soft law,316 and private law among critical 
apex actors in supply chains themselves along with their home states.317 It fits in 
nicely with the fundamental insight of TLO theory—merely shifting focus from 
regulatory objects to regulatory systems as the better means of avoiding the 
difficulty of regulating actors across borders. But that inverts the traditional 
structure of law—one regulatory apparatus regulating multiple actors—to one in 
which multiple actors regulate one system.318
The notion of the supply chain itself as a governance order could be 
understood as a basis for recent efforts to conceptualize a model of global supply 
316.  See OECD, Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear Sector, 
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/responsible-supply-chains-textile-garment-sector.htm.  
317.  See, e.g., Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER), Agreement on 
Sustainable Garment and Textile, supra note 235.  
318.  The World Economic Forum White Paper provides a variant of this approach: 
It requires the collective action, influence and resources of all major stakeholders in global supply 
chains, including global companies, national-level suppliers, developed and developing governments, 
international financial and labour organizations, workers and trade unions, civil society, private 
philanthropy, and development agencies that are often central to public-private partnerships. 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR SUPPLY CHAINS 4 (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_Supply 
_Chains_%20A_New_Paradigm_2015.pdf. 
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chain risk management.319 This literature suggests that the supply chain can be 
considered an order that is transnational.320 Hence, a useful definition that itself 
suggests coherence and systemic autonomy within the context of risk management: 
“The objective of supply chains are profit maximization. . . . Finding the balance 
between productivity (efficiency) and profitability (effectiveness) . . . to move goods 
and materials between nations in a timely and seamless manner . . . so as to enhance 
the profitability if the supply chain as a whole is the guiding mantra.”321 Enterprise 
risk management is itself sometimes a name used to describe the ordering 
characteristics of risk management based governance approaches within supply 
chains.322
B. Polycentric Ordered Anarchy or the Classical State System Rebooted? 
It is possible to conceptualize the supply chain, then, as either a transnational 
legal order, or as a nexus point of TLOs whose interaction touch on the way their 
respective legal orders interact with the supply chain itself. At the end of the day, 
the order that emerges in either version is one that legalizes, under dynamic 
transnational standards, systems of factory inspection and labor relations baselines 
within global supply chains. Beyond that narrow transnational ordering—disorder, 
governance rather than legality, and national supra-nationalism.323
But it is also possible to look across an autonomous supply chain, the arc of 
the history that marks the Rana Plaza building collapse and the scope of orders that 
saw in that arc a necessity for extending or applying their legal orders, and see . . . 
nothing. That is, it is possible to see no system in supply chains, no autonomy, and 
most importantly no legal ordering. Anne-Marie Slaughter has spoken to the 
possibility of an anarchic character, of the “need for global rules without centralized 
power” in transnational space.324 Building on that insight, Marc Amstutz notes that 
world law “constructs itself by means of a dynamic interlinkage with the laws of 
nation states.”325 Law, then, is not an ordering principle—and one ultimately tied to 
319.  See, e.g., Ila Manuj & John T. Mentzer, Global Supply Chain Risk Management, 29 J. BUS.
LOGISTICS 133-54 (2008). 
320.  Id. at 134. 
321.  Id. (citing among others, Richard T. Hise, The Implications of Time Based Competition on 
International Logistics Strategies, 38 BUS. HORIZONS 39-45 (1995); Paul T. Nelson & Gadi Toledano, 
Challenges for International Logistics Management, 1 J. BUS. LOGISTICS 1-21 (1979); John T. Mentzer & John 
Firman, Logistics Control Systems in the 21st Century, 15 J. BUS. LOGISTICS 215-27 (1994); Donald J. 
Bowersox & Roger J. Calatone, Global Logistics, 6 J. INT’L MARKETING 83-93 (1998)). 
322.  See, e.g., Vicky Arnold, Tanya S. Benford, Clark Hampton, and Steven G. Sutton, Enterprise 
Risk Management as a Strategic Governance Mechanism in B2B-Enabled Transnational Supply Chains, 26 J. INFO.
SYSTEMS 51-76 (2012). 
323.  See, e.g., Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of 
Normative Orders, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373-96 (2008) (discussing the emerging disorder of orders in an 
increasingly normative polycentric universe of orders).  
324.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10 (Princeton, 2004). 
325.  Marc Amstutz, The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the 
Constitution of a Global Law For Multinational Enterprises, 3 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZMARKTRECHT (SZW/RSDA) 189-98, 195 (2015).  
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a static conception of states. Rather law, and especially the law of transnational 
orders—serves not as an end point but as a means of linkage within dynamic 
systems—and the functions of law become detached from its form.326 Like the UN 
Guiding Principles themselves, a TLO becomes the means for integrating 
transnational activity into the environments in which they are active with reference 
to a common set of organizing and normative principles, locally applied. And thus 
a distinctive approach to anarchy in the transnational sphere: “An absence of 
statutory norms need not be synonymous with lawlessness.”327
As an exemplar, then, Rana Plaza itself may be mis-centered as the site for a 
system centered on a singular regulatory architecture; Rana Plaza attracts systemic 
action but itself cannot be understood as the framework for order—whether or not 
legal or transnational. As such, TLO theory is useful for its insight that effects or sites
of transnational governance are incapable of serving as the framework for order. 
The best TLO theory can offer us, then, is a conceptual framework for 
understanding the way that actors can respond to stimuli (supply chains, 
catastrophes, etc.), since these stimuli themselves cannot serve as foundations for 
TLOs.
1. Polycentric governance orders 
 The absence of a system grounded within a centering framework does not 
suggest a lack of order. It only suggests the lack of a singular order. There is a 
consequence for TLO theory: the possibility that it does not describe a cluster of 
legal orders that are centered, but rather that Rana Plaza evidences the fractured 
though ordered ecologies of different TLOs. The Rana Plaza arc, the supply chain 
it exemplifies, is characterized by dynamic segmented TLOs, to be sure. But it is 
also marked by transnational governance orders and by national orders, each of which 
revolves around their respective jurisdictional borders and operating within the logic 
of their institutional strictures. Together, these actors bumped up against each other 
precisely because the building collapse collapsed the space separating these 
institutionalized orders. Fabrizio Cafaggi has spoken to the rise of transnational 
private regulatory regimes created by a host of public and private actors that lack 
the forms and character of law, but that may have the effect of law.328 Thus, where 
TLO theory may see a legal ordering, transnational private regulation theory may 
see governance. One focuses on the formal structures of behavior control within a 
community, the other on the effect of behavior control mechanics whatever their 
form. Both, of course, assume, to some extent, the viable autonomy of those 
institutional actors that produce either the legal forms or the effective tactics of 
regulation. 
326.  Id. at 191.  
327.  Id. at 198. 
328.  See Fabrizio Caffagi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. SOC’Y 20-49
(2011). 
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One can see in the supply chain regulatory structures, especially like that 
illustrated through the Rana Plaza supply chain, an integrated and complementary 
convergence point where distinct regulatory orders—legal and governance—might 
meet at the point of intersection of their respective jurisdictions, whether 
territorially or functionally differentiated. This complementarity tends to obscure 
the distinct orders which contribute to what in the aggregate looks like a single 
approach but which in reality is no more than the layering of complementary 
systems. This is particularly revealed in more well-defined supply chains, for 
example agricultural and food production.329 But its structures are becoming clearer 
in consumer goods industries.330
The system constitutes itself as an organism with governance structures. These 
governance structures are devolved and fractured to reflect the functionally 
differentiated components of the supply chain itself—along territorial, functional 
and production oriented lines. Stakeholders tend to focus on these segments rather 
than on the supply chain itself as an autonomous governance order.331 It is not 
surprising, then, that the unity of the supply chain, as a singular space for 
governance, is itself a composite of multiple sub-governance zones. But this 
composite might be better understood as the amalgamation of governance orders 
around a system, one without a centering apparatus. In this sense, the supply chain 
is self-constituting, and transnational, but it is not a legal order. It is a governance 
pass through—a sorting but not organizing structure. The supply chain is instead a 
hybrid legal-governance order of devolved power organized through public and 
private systems only partially mediated through law, and thus only partially mediated 
through those public bodies through which law may only be expressed. 
But that mingling did not necessarily imply an order to that co-mingling, to 
that intermeshing within the context of necessary reactions to the building collapse. 
It is possible to see in supply chains, like Rana Plaza, the space within which it is 
(finally) possible to understand that while segmented governance or legal orders 
may be centered within their respective logics (their ideologies that give shape to 
their frameworks and solidify their borders), those orders may not be ordered by a 
singular logic. That is, Rana Plaza should point to an ordering framework within 
which a TLO can be discerned. And yet rather than illuminating the structures of a 
TLO around a subject of order—Rana Plaza—it instead shows supply chain 
329.  See, e.g., Linda Fulponi, Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the Agro-Food System,
AGR/CAAPM (2006)9/FINAL (2006), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments 
/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=AGR/CA/APM%282006%299/FINAL&docLanguage=En; 
Spencer Henson & John Humphry, Understanding the Complexities of Private Standards in Global Agri-Food 
Chains as they Impact Developing Countries, 46 J. DEV. STUD. 1628-46 (2010). 
330.  See, e.g., Richard Applebaum, Giant Transnational Contractors in East Asia: Emergent Trends in 
Global Supply Chains, 12 COMPETITION & CHANGE 69-87 (2008). 
331.  A good example touches on the role that civil society organizations see for themselves in 
the context of supply chains—not the ordering of the supply chain itself, but the engagement with the 
activities of various components of that system. See, e.g., David J. Doorey, The Transparent Supply Chain: 
from Resistance to Implementation at Nike and Levi-Strauss, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 587-603 (2011). 
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systems like Rana Plaza as themselves objects of more functionally differentiated 
and partial TLOs, each operating within and for the maximization of their own logic 
and ideology and none contributing to an order that is centered on Rana Plaza 
itself.332
Yet Rana Plaza, as representative of the autonomous supply chain in time, is 
itself a subject of ordering. Rana Plaza, the supply chain system, then, might be 
better understood as a framing element—like the state in globalization—within 
which governance converges within the logic of the centering system itself. But the 
supply chain itself does not provide an internally coherent and centering element, 
just a structure within which governance systems converge to the extent of their 
conjoining with that system—and only to that extent. But it is a subject of ordering 
without a center, without a leader. It remains little more than an amalgamation of 
the consequences of the determinations of ordering systems. Thus, what Rana Plaza 
suggests is not the power of TLOs so much as the power of fracture as the 
governing insight for understanding the locus of power, and thus the scope and 
character of law and governance, within the transnational sphere in those areas that 
count—where events occur that trigger the full range of regulatory responses 
available to governance orders.333
Rana Plaza, then, might be clearly illustrative of the polycentricity,334 the 
absence of a single ordering principle, in the structure of governance respecting any 
governance territory—whether based on territory, function, operation, or relations. 
Rana Plaza may also suggest the need for TLO theorizing that develops the issue of 
anarchy in governance ordering, that is of polycentricity within and among 
governance ordering.335 There was no centering in Rana Plaza or in any of its sub-
systemic ordering systems that suggests order that is not specifically self-referencing 
within their own governance orbits. And yet the supply chain itself might be that 
centering—that singularity, within which coherent governance occurs. In this 
respect, both polycentric and TLO theory would posit the existence of an order 
from out of the supply chain. And Rana Plaza appears to give that insight some 
substance. But this is a governance order of a kind quite distinct from what has 
come before. It is no longer grounded in the tangible—territory, capitals, people—
it is intangible, systemic and functionally differentiated, layered upon, within, and 
through other others. 
332.  Consider this in light of recent scholarship on the governance ordering of CSR within 
supply chains. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in 
Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711-44 (2009).  
333.  And even those responses might themselves be subject to fracture within the logic of 
globalization. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The 
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137-91 (2010) (discussing the disaggregation of 
legal services within what might be understood as a legal services supply chain TLO or private 
governance system).  
334.  See, e.g., Paul D. Aligica & Vlad Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond, 25 
GOVERNANCE 237-62 (2012). 
335.  Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 21st Century: 
Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177-99 (2012). 
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The differences between a polycentric and a TLO view of the supply chain 
system as structure may center on two distinct points. The first touches on the 
character of governance. A polycentric theory recognizes ordering that is regulatory 
though not legal, that can exist independent of the structures and legitimating 
devices of the state. TLO theory tends, still, to incorporate, and be anchored in, the 
structures, mechanics, and techniques of the state. TLO theory might well be 
understood as a method of tying transnational legal orders back into the state 
system. Private governance might be understood as positing an extra-legal universe 
in which legality rather than law is the touchstone.336 Polycentric governance might 
embrace the broadest view, focusing on the effects of techniques rather than either 
their origins or forms. 
The second touches on the supply chain itself. Here a large variation is possible 
under either perspective. Two are most prominent. The first posits supply chain 
system autonomy. To understand Rana Plaza, then, is to understand the supply 
chain system that both produced its governance framework and to examine the 
techniques used to manage and order it in the face of stress (the building collapse). 
Supply chain systems may be thus understood as the “territory” of a governance 
order. As such, they might serve, like states, as sites for and about regulation.337 The 
second posits supply chains as nexus or convergence points for governance, in 
which jurisdiction is itself functionally differentiated. Supply chain systems, then, 
may be understood as a space where either governance is centered even if the 
governance systems are themselves autonomous, or where governance is centered 
on the supply chain itself though power is devolved among its stakeholder 
constituents. The supply chain system that is Rana Plaza may be harmonized with 
each of these frames of analysis. 
C. The return of a hierarchically ordered state system.  
Are there alternatives to either approach? Consider here both the way in which 
Rana Plaza fits comfortably into traditional narratives of a state-law system, and the 
possibility of neo-feudal ordering grounded on the centrality of production, 
political, societal and other functionally differentiated chains, not chaos exactly, but 
more like governance in Angevin France. 
Indeed, Ralf Michaels’338 insights about the role of TLO theory within states 
might add something valuable to the TLO discourse. Rana Plaza suggests that there 
is something to the notion that states might be understood as TLOs, especially 
within the emerging global legal orders in which state fracture opens their territory 
to governance through multiple legal order. But that raises two questions, each of 
336.  Cf. Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational 
Regulatory Systems, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS (eds., Christian 
Brütsch, Dirk Lehmkuhl, 2007). 
337.  See, e.g., Phil James, Richard Johnstone, Michael Quinlan, & Dave Walters, Regulating Supply 
Chains to Improve Health and Safety, 36 INDUS. L. J. 163-87 (2007).  
338.  Michaels, supra note 304. 
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which will be briefly considered. First, if states can contain TLOs, then might one 
postulate that all national orders are or ought to be (if appropriately developed) 
transnational in character given the logic of globalization (for example). Second, if 
that is not the case, and indeed, that some states retain legal integrity while other 
fracture within global polycentric orders that can be projected within their 
territories, then might TLO theory be deployed to create a new justification for the 
sort of sovereign hierarchy that characterized international law before the 1930s; 
that is, only a small group of “advanced” states can be understood as exhibiting the 
characteristics of national-national orders, and all others may be national but in 
relation to the transnational, they may be inferior. 
If the first insight is correct, then, to some extent, TLO theory suggests a 
necessary reconsideration of notions of sovereignty, and of the legitimate 
foundations of the state. That, for example, might explain the logic of securities 
internationalization through the Financial Stability Board in which the sensibilities 
of the U.S. and EU are meant to be crammed down other states.339 It certainly 
explains the relationships between Bangladesh and the U.S. and EU. And it provides 
a basis for situating the ILO within the power dynamics of a U.S.-EU drive to 
manage the internal domestic legal order of Bangladesh to their satisfaction by using 
the veil of internationalization (and the mechanics of ILO principles) to leverage 
their authority in Bangladesh and in the process to substitute this TLO for the 
traditional relationship between citizens and their government at the heart of 
legitimate state power within the ideology of legitimate constitutional states. 
Conventional international relations theory might see in that relationship both the 
neo-colonialism inherent in unequal relationships between advanced and 
“developing” states, but also the power dynamics of tutelage and the effective 
inability of less-developed states to resist the hijacking of their domestic legal orders 
to serve the interests of developed states, now incorporated within internationalized 
norms that effectively shift the locus of political authority from the Bangladeshi 
demos to that of the international TLO communities affected by the factory 
building collapse. Peter Hansen provides a quite blunt description of this TLO 
dynamic.340 Thus, if this perspective has value, it suggests the need to theorize the 
339.  Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 751-802 (2011). 
340.  Contrasting the reaction of TLO to crisis in Bangladesh and Africa he noted: 
Had Rana Plaza been located in a suburb outside Accra rather than outside Dhaka, the 
response would have been quite different. Rather than see it as an isolated and all-too-typical 
industrial accident in the developing world, the U.S. media would have assailed U.S. 
complicity in the horrors of an industrializing Africa that had been pristine and innocent. 
Advocates of the Global South would have produced articles and conferences bemoaning 
the ceaseless exploitation of African workers. Congressional hearings would have heard 
testimony not about safeguarding Africa’s “brand,” but rather about how harshly U.S. 
officials had chided their African counterparts. (The fact that even troubled Nigeria has a 
better “brand” than Bangladesh on important metrics would be blithely ignored.) There 
would have been calls to impose stringent labor conditions in investment treaty negotiations 
with African countries, despite the fact that the United States does not impose such 
conditions on existing partners like Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the “development aid” industry 
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transformation of internationalism within the context of globalization. This is not 
the state system rendered under the ideology of states after 1945. Rana Plaza 
suggests the re-invigoration of the conception of the state system, hierarchically 
arranged, as it was conceived before 1939.341
But the more conventional reading of Rana Plaza suggests not merely the 
possibilities of a reversion of hierarchies of state power, and with it the fracture of 
the sovereign power of lower tiered states, but also of the polycentricity inherent in 
the emerging global legal order. That polycentricity produces a governance terrain 
in which political power is itself shared among public and private actors. These 
actors occupy the same territories but with quite distinct authority, simultaneously 
asserting governance power in an internally coherent and externally networked way. 
It suggests a new and multilateral re-institution of the feudal structures of neo-feudal 
ordering grounded on the centrality of production, political, societal and other 
functionally differentiated chains, not chaos exactly, but more like governance in 
Angevin France. Not, of course, in terms of the personal relationships at the heart 
of feudalism, but rather in the intermeshed institutional relationships in which a 
pyramid of power could claim some authority within a single territorial unit. Within 
this approach, Rana Plaza provides a nexus point for the simultaneous activation of 
governance power by actors who are free to act autonomously, but whose efforts 
might be coordinated in the course of intergovernmental efforts at coordination, or 
not. The dynamics of the cooperative-competitive relationship between Accord and 
Alliance suggest the nature of these relationships. And within this operation, 
Bangladesh, of course, plays a somewhat passive and minor role. And for those who 
still hold to that vision inaugurated by the defeat of the Axis in 1945, the reality of 
Rana Plaza might be depressing indeed. 
IV. CONCLUSION.
The life story of the Rana Plaza factory building, from its development on the 
cusp of Bangladesh’s enthusiastic entry into streams of global commerce and 
investment, through its collapse and its aftermath, then, might serve as a marker of 
the shape and character of emerging normative orders derived from, perhaps 
sourced in, traditional notions of law and authority, but now morphed into 
something quite distinct. But it is a distinctiveness also grounded on the patterns 
and forms, quite comforting to large institutional actors, that are traditional and look 
back on a system that has become in some places almost unrecognizable. Law, the 
state, enterprises, governance, obligation and the like, terms well understood in the 
late 20th century, appear to have acquired new meanings, even as the forms they 
would discuss with its enablers in the federal bureaucracy and congressional committees how 
“aid” studies and capacity-building programs could promote the adoption and enforcement 
of better African labor and building codes. 
Peter C. Hansen, Avoiding Harmful Overreach When Promoting Human Rights In African Investments, 35 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1113, 1115-17 (2014) (citations omitted). 
341.  See, e.g., WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW
307-13 (1924). 
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represent are wielded by a new cast of actors. If this world has order, it may well be 
theorized as transnational legal orders. Yet it may also reflect order within multiple 
hierarchies, or something else. Many theories are chasing facts at the moment. But 
it may be too early to tell whether the hunt will be successful, or whether facts may 
soon turn on and further reshape theory. 
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